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This thesis develops an algorithm for the sclection of objectives for forced entry military 
operations in a theatcr levcl campaign modcL The Joint Warfare Analysis Experimental Prototype 
(JW AEP) is an interactive, 2-sided, theater-level combat model based on an an.:-node 
representalion of ground, air, llnd littoral combat. It may be used in an interactive gaming mode or 
a closed-form stochastic analysis mode. The need for active mission assignment in the analysis 
mode mandates that objectives for combat operations bc nominatcd during each planning cycle to 
adapt to thc changing face of the battleficld. JWAEP would execute an initial fl:asibility check for 
enemy occupied or controlled nodes against the assets availahle to the friendly forc!;.":s. Bascd on 
the prohahilistic representation of the enemy units occupying a node. the algorithm detennines the 
relalive value of perceived maneuver units and static targets. This is then compared lo the relative 
perceived slrength of the units in that node and surrounding nodes which lllay also defend against 
the operation. The perceived strength d!;.":tennines the threat; it is calculated for each forcc capable 
of execllting the attack. The most desirable node for each force, given value and threat, is sent to 
the appropriate planning moduli:. The principal focus of this thesis is on the determination of the 
target value parameter and thc node defensibility parameter as they are used to nominat!;.": and rank 
possihle objectives 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
The Joint Warfare Advanced Experimental Prototype (JWAEP) represents an 
attempt by the Naval Postgraduate School's Department of Operations Research, under the 
sponsorship of the Directorille for Force Stmcture, Resources, and Assessment (1-8) of the 
Joint Chiefs of Staff and the U.S. A.rmy Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOq, to 
improve existing techniques of modeling joint theater level combat. The ultimate goal of 
JW AEP is to fully represent the dynamic, um:eI1ain, and stochastic nature of combat aI the 
theater level. It is intended be a fully eapahle simulation which requires little or no input 
from human operators during execution when operating in a systemic analysis mode. 
One specific need to accomplish this goal is the ability for the model to assign 
missions to units during execution. The assignment of a strategic or theater mission may 
be driven by factors external to the model. The model, however, mu st develop 
intennediate missions and objectives which help accumplish those strategic goals. These 
intermediate missions may include offensive operations, defensive operatio ns, raids, and 
forced cntry missions 
A foreed entry mission attempts to insert a large number of friendly combat forces 
into enemy occupied or cuntrolled areas for the purpose of securing those areas for further 
operations. The amphibious assault, the airborne assault, and the air mobile assault arc the 
three primary types uf forced entry missions. During a campaign, an operational 
commander may use the amphibious. airburne, or air mubile fur(;es in order to seize entry 
ports, establish air heads, or (;reate an additional threat to the enemy from an unexpected 
direction. These missions will require an ohjective to act as the focal point for the 
maneuver forces 
The choice of a mission objective should reflect the operational commander's desire 
to control that area and its immediate surroundings. There will be three principal 
considerations for the selection of the objectives. The first is a measure of how much the 
maneuver commander desires the occupation or control of the area, either for his own 
purposes or to deny the enemy its use, It is his perception of its value. The second is a 
measure of how imponant that area is to accomplishing the strategic goals of the campaign 
The third is a measure of how much force the enemy is willing to expem.l in order to 
maintain control oflhat area. 
The value of an objcctive can be broken into four principal categories: military, 
po\iti(;al, economic, and social. Each location or unit will have some value from these four 
categories due to either infrastructure or enemy units present. II will be up to the 
operational commander and his staff to asse~s each of the four valucs for each unit or 
location as well as the perceived assets of enemy units in the area. By combining thcse 
values for all four categorics in a manner that captures their relative importance, a single 
number for ea(;h objectivc can bc used to compare it against all other possible objectives. 
Higher value at a potential objective implies a greater desire to prosecute that objective. 
The imponanec of a particular area relative to the stratcgic goals may be a function 
of how dose the operational objective is to ~he seat of power or wntrol for the enemy 
nation (which may be a strategic obje(;tive). Comparing the distance from the operational 
objective to strategic objective to the distance from (;UITCnI fricndly positions to the strategic 
obje(;tive gives a relativc measufC ofthc benefit ga.incd from each objective ovcr the current 
situation. 
The final wnsideration, the cstimate of encmy forccs that can defend an objectivc, 
is based on the size and type of enemy units perceived in the arca. Units in nearby areas 
may affect the estimate and are included in the calculation of defenSibility for each 
objective. 
This thesis prescnts an algorithm that evaluates each of these three measures (value, 
strategic importan(;e, and defensibility) and then combines them to detcrm.ine the most 
desirable forced entry mission objective. The algorithm uses the representations of the 
perceptions of enemy uniL~ that arc unique to JW AEr. 
After determining which areas are eligible for the different forced entry mission 
types, the algorithm computes each ofthc three. measures for these potential ohjectives. The 
value calculation is essentially a weighted sum of all of the typ:s of value possessed by the 
units and infrastructure at each objective. The weights represent the operational 
commander's relative importance of each of the value types. The total value for a specific 
objective will come from three sources: the enemy units located on the objective, the 
infrastrul:lure on the objective. and the inherent value pos~essed by the objective itself. 
Sinee exact enemy locations are not always availablc to a dccision maker, the algorithm 
computes an expected encmy unit value in each of the four value categories. This is done 
using the perception probahilities which JW AEP uses to represent the current estimate of 
the size and type of enemy forces at a specific location. The strategic importance 
cakulations use straight forv.'ard methods to determine the relative advantage one 
operational objectivc has over another in regards to the location of the strategic objective. 
The defensibility parameter of each potential ohjective is calculated using the 
estimate of the number of combat assets in and around that objective as determined from 
sensor detcctions rcpresented by JW AEP. These detections have associated with them a 
measure of nnccrtainty that can be nscd to producc a conservative estimate of the number of 
assets that could be present on the objective when the mission is executed. 
Each of these three parametcrs (value, strategic importance, and dcfensibility) arc 
then combined by first cunverting the parameter values to a common scale of measurement 
and then uses a weighted sum to produce a single mcasure of desirability. The weights can 
represent the operational eommandcr's relat ive concern with each of the three measures. If 
he is extremely ambitious, he may not include the enemy defenses in the overall desirability 
calculations. 1f he is overly cautions, hc may use only the defenses to detcmllne the best 
objective. 
Thc analysis indicates that the algurithm prop;:rly cvaluates these parameters for a 
small gronp of objcctivcs and, depending on the weights uscd, produces logical preferencc 
rank.ings for the objectives. In the cases examined, the outcomes are consistent with the 
'"common-sense" choices that would have been made. Additiunally, an examination of the 
impact of varying certain parameters that are used in the algorithm was made. In general, 
the changes produccd were consistent with conventional wisdom; howe,-er, in some case.~ 
the magnitude of the effect was Jess than was expected 
Overall, the algorithm appears to work properly for the slllall test scenario. The 
results, howe,-er, require earehll examination because the output values can be nearly 
equal. Thus, while one may be higher, it is impnrtant to take into account the magnitude 
of the diffcrenee before just choosing one as the "best". Tn some cases, two or three 
objectives might he cnnsidered equally desirable and further analysis should be conducted 
prior to final selt:cliun of the sole mission objective 

I. INTRODlJCTION 
Since the genesis of the cumputcr age, the United States Department of Defense has 
relied heavily on computers to improve all aspects uf its operations and functions . While 
computers have become indispensable time savers in matters of pay procedures, record 
keeping amI day to day administrative fu nctioning, the truly great henefits have been seen 
in the operational arcas uf the Department of Defense. Computer technology has made 
communications more reliahle, aircraft safer, and weapons deadlier; hut alongside these 
tangible improvements, the ability to model future operations and predict their outcomes 
has emerged. Computer wargames can create nutional battlefields and allow decision 
makers to practice fig hting wars without risking human lives. Computer simulations can 
help determine organizational shortfalls and cven predict the combat effectiveness of a 
weapon system not yet manufactured. They have been used to predict the outcomes of 
major land battles, modify existing campaign plans, and examine the capabilities of the 
fo rces or equipment expected to fight in future conflicts 
The Joint Warfare Advanced Experimental Prototype (JWAEP) represents an 
attempt by the Naval Postgraduate School"s Department of Operations Research, under the 
sponsorship of the Directorate for Foree Structure, Resourees, and Assessment (1-8) of the 
Joint Chiefs of Staff and the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), tu 
improve existing techniques of modeling joint theater Icvel combat. The ultimate goal of 
JW" AEP is to fully represent the dynamic, uncertain, and stochastic nature of combat at the 
theater level. It is intended he a fully operational simulation which requires little or no 
input from human operators during execution 
One specific need to accomplish this goal is the ability for the model to assign 
lIussions to uni ts during e~ecution. It is not sufficient to assign a general "attack" mission 
for all units in the model, as there should be larger operations that will need more cumpkx 
orders to better simulate realistic campaign operations. In order to make the model more 
robust in the t:rcation, planning, and execution of different offensive missions, the ability to 
designate an objective becomes paramounl. The assignment of a strategic or theater 
mission may be driven hy eonsidcrations external to the modcL but the model must develop 
intermediate missions which work tuward accomplishing Ihe strategic guals. These 
intcrmediate missions arc the responsihility uf thc operational commander or similar entity 
rcpresented in the model. The decisions that he makes should be made by any theater level 
model that strives to be systemic, or closed, in its decision making process. 
A. PURPOSE 
The purpose of this thesis is to develup a method for nominating potential 
objectives for operational forced entry missions and then rank ordering them by preference. 
These initial rankings could then be used to provide mission uhjectives to different planning 
modules to determine which arc considered both feasible and most desirabk. The primary 
considerations for ehuosing a missiun objective are the value the area has to the enemy's 
ability to prosecute the war and the extent to which he will defend that ahility. The choice 
becomes a decision made to satisfy two competing desires of the operational commander: 
conduct operations that will result in the ddeat of the enemy and safeguard the lives of the 
personnel under his command. It is not easy to strike a halance between them 
A method for measuring advantage gained against the risk involved is needed to 
compare perceived value of a given area in the theater possessed by the enemy against the 
estimated ddensive capahility present. This thesis investigates one method of measuring 
value, strategic imponanee, and defensibility which is flexible in its implementation. 
R. FORMAT 
Chapler I has presented a brief description of JW AEP and the specifi.:; purpose of 
this thesis. 
Chaptcr II prescnts the necessary background in warfare principals wncerning 
campaign operations in a theater-level conOict and a more detailed review of JWAEP and its 
capabilities and advantages over other models currently in use by most of the services. The 
definitions of some of the terminology and parameters whieh arc new to the JW AEP 
lexicon are also presented. 
Chapter III describes the specific steps taken by the algorithm to nominate and 
prioritize target areas for furthcr analysis. The necessary additions to the JWAEP database 
arc also discusscd. 
Chapter IV presents thc initial analysis of tile results of using the algorithm on a 
small network. The purpose is to investigate the impact of changing the inpnt parameters 
for the algorithm and 10 verify the output rankings as much as possible. 
Chapter V contains the conclusions and recommendations for future work. Further 
areas of study will be addressed. both in an effort to improve Ihis specific research area as 
well as the entire J\VAEP model in general. 

II. BACKGROUND 
A. WARFIGHTING PRINCIPALS AND TERMS 
It is important to be thoroughly versed in the terminology and current doctrine of 
warfare in order to model it properly. The following tenns arc the principal concepts that 
encompass operational mission assignment. 
1. Strategic Level 
While the word "strategy" is routinely used by society to describe a plan of action in 
any circumstance, for military leaders it has a vely explicit meaning. The term "grand or 
nat ional strategy" refers to the activities a nation undertakes that strive to attain the 
objectives of policy, in peace and in war [Ref. I: p. 3]. All of the resources of a nation are 
included, not just its mili tary . In a democracy, policy (and therefore national strategy) is 
excl usively in the realm of elected and appointed officials. The concept of ":\1ilitary 
Strategy" brings the execution of policy into the arena of specific military actions. Here the 
use of force, or alleast the threat of force, is the principal tool , 
The strategic level of war is the level at which a nation (or a group of nations in a 
coalilion) detennines national (or muHi-natjonal) security objectives and uses its (or their) 
national resources to accomplish these objectives [Ref. 2: p. 363J. The strategic level 
involves the development of war plans, the selection and deployment of forces, and the 
determination of military objectives which will directly assist in achieving political and 
military aims. In the United Slates, these decisions arc typically made by senior elected 
officials (most notably the President), Presidential appointees, and the senior leadership of 
the Annoo Forces. 
2, Operational Level 
The operational level of war acts as the link from the policy makers and strategic 
decisions to the warfighters and tactical decisions. It is the level at which campaigns and 
major operations arc planned, conducted, and suslaim::d to accomplish strategic objectives 
within theaters or areas of operations [Ref. 2: p. 275]. The ultimate goal of operational 
conunanders is to achie .... e the established strategic aim through the planning, coordination 
and execution of tactical missions. Traditionally, an operational level of cOlllmand is within 
the purview of one of the Conunander-in-Chiefs (CinCs) of the Unified Commands who 
will report direcuy to ute National O::J1nmand Authority (NCA). 
3, Tactic~1 Level 
The tactical level of war is the level at which battles and engagements are planned 
illld executed to accomplish military objectives assigned to tactical units or task forces [Ref. 
2: p. 376]. It is where a force applies its combat power directly against its opponent. It is 
the world of combat [Ref. 1: p. 51. On the taciicallevel, the interaction between opposing 
forces is measured in meters, seconds, and most importantly. lives. For the infantry, 
tactical fundamentals exist in the domain of the fire team of four soldiers, through the 
battalion 0[600 soldiers, and possibly up to the division of 15,000 soldiers. In general, 
tactics are the tool of the trigger pulier, whether of a rifle, a missile, or a torpedo 
4, Interaction and Overlap 
rhe translation between the levels of war and the levels of command is nne that 
must be done with each new conflict or scenario. The only constants exist at the extrem~; 
the highest level of strategy coming from the leaders of the nations and Ihe lowest level of 
tactics at the individual soldier. In relatively minor conflicts or small-scale contingency 
missions, the strategic and tactical levels may rneet at the task force commander who would 
be in direct contact with the NCA and in dircct command of thc combatants. For Major 
Regional Contingcncics (MRCs), the operational level would widen to include Corps and 
Army levels of command 
A notable characteristic of (he scpmation of the three levels of war is the impact of 
success and failure in each. Tactical success does not automatically guarantee the 
accomplishment of the stratcgic aims and tactical incompetence will not always deny them: 
however, there is a strong correlation. Similarly, thc failure to clearly identify strategic 
goals makes their necessary translation to military missions and objectives a futile task. 
The operational level must synthesize the tactical results to create the military conditions that 
induce strategic success [Ref. 1: p. 871. 
5. The Operational Commander 
Between the two extremes of strategy and tactics, the operational commander must 
refine military objectives as strategy changes and mllst also attempt to influence strategy if 
the tactical goals become impossible to meet. Hc must strike the balance between resources 
provided and force-s comJn.itted, between political and social concerns and the security of 
his charges, and betwecn current and future combat. Ultimately, it is he who must bridgc 
the span between "the lofty heights of strategy" and the gritty reali ty of tactics in combat 
[Ref. 1: p. 6]. 
This importance of the operational decision maker translates directly into the need 
for the representation of a similar entity in a theater level modd. It is not sufficient to have 
a vast array of units on a battlefield where they fight as autonomous combat elements 
engaging eaeh other without a coherent operational plan. A force that fjghts in a clear, 
coordinated manner will have a decided advantage over one that does not. The application 
of combat power at a specific place and time can result in succe~s, even for an outnumbered 
force in unfamili.u tI;::rrilOry. The operational commander must orchestrate the usc of all his 
assets - ground combat units, air forces, reserve forces, logistic units, and other 
supporting forces - to achieve success in a theater-level campaign. It is through the 
efficient integration of all these forces that success is achieved most rapidly. 
6. Mancu\'cr Warfare 
Maneuver warfarc is a warfighting philosophy that seeks to shatter the enemy's 
cohesion through a series of rapid, violent, and unexpected actions which create a turbulent 
and rapidly deterioraling situation with which he cannot cope [Ref. 3: p. 59]. The principal 
elements of maneuver warfare include speed, surprise, flexibility, initiative, and intensity. 
Decentralized decision making enables the maximum degree of speed and flexibility on the 
battlefield. 
a. Decision makillg 
The heavy emphasis placed on decentralized decision makin g requires 
clearly defined commander's intent to allow his forces to act and react quickly on the 
battlefield in order to shape the battle tow.ud hi.~ vision of the final result. Paramount to the 
success of a unit in combat is the ability to rapidly make decisions, capitalizing on 
situational awareness and opportunity, not focusing on lock step procedures known by 
rote. Decisions must be made in l ight of the enemy's anticipated reactions and 
counteractions, recognizing that while we are trying to impose our will on the enemy. he is 
trying to do the samc to us [Ref. 3: p. 68]. By consistently making decisions faster than 
our opponent, we achieve an advantage in init iative which carries over to an advantage 
which impacts the entire conflict. The four-step mental process of decision making, as set 
forth by Colonel John Boyd, USAF, is the Observation, Orientation, Decision, Action 
(GOVA) loop as shown in Figurc 1 [Ref. 3: p. 84] The faster a commander move.~ 
through his decision-making cyck (i.e., a smaller OODA loop), the more he imposes his 
will on lhe I:nemy. If his loop is consistently lightcr. he overwhelms the enemy with his 
force 's actions and paralyzes their ability to fight. 
Igure 1. oy yc e uop) 
h. Uncertainty 
With the inherent uncertainty in combat operations, perfect information is 
not available to make "perfl:ct" lkcisions. The desire, then, is to make (il:cisions involving 
aeceptahle risk and to continue to do this fastl:[ than thl: I:nellly. To quote Gen. George S. 
Patton, USA: 
"A good plan violently executed now is ocHer than a petiecI plan 
I:xecuted next week." [Ref. 3: p. 701 
Uncer1.1inty 011 thl: battlefJdd directly affects the Observation and Orientation 
phases of the decision making cycle. If a commander is able to "see" the situation more 
clearly than his opponent, he can orient more quickly and his decisions will have cvcn 
greater effect. Since both sides in a conflict experience this "fog of war'·. the advantagc 
will be gained by the side that accepts its inevitable prl:sence and has trained to make 
dc(;isions in light of it. Waiting until a situation has unfolded completely is a guaranteed 
recipe for failure on the battlefield. 
7. Centers of Gravity 
The strategic center of gravity is traditionally the enemy's capital city; however. this 
need not be always the case. According to Karl von Clausewitz: 
"Out of these characteristics a certain center of gravity develops. the 
hub of al l power and movement, on which everything depends. That is the 
point against which all our energies should be directed." [Ref. 4: p. 595-
596] 
In a theater level conflict, it is unlikely that the strategit center of gravity would 
change rapidly during the conflict. It is important to remember that the strategic center of 
gravity may not coincide with the operational centers of gravity at a given time. The 
operational centers of gravity arc often the encmy forces which prohibit cither the sei7.ure of 
the strategic objective or accomplishment of the strategic goals. If the capital city is heavily 
defended by the military forces, then they may coincide. 
If the strategic goal of the campaign is the destruction of the cnemy's military 
power, the center of gravity may he the upper levels of its military leadership or a particular 
unit. A Cold War era, Central Europe scenario might have suggested an enemy ecnter of 
gravity of the Warsaw Pact forces. Rather than attacking this center of gravity directly, thc 
neutralization of the forces could be attained by aggressive attacks on the command and 
control or logistics stmClUre that support the actual combat forces. [Ref. 5: p. l00J 
8 .. lo'orced Entry Mission 
The goal of a forced entry mission is 10 establish a force in enemy controlled 
territory in order to prosecute operations intended to strike specific targets. The principal 
10 
methods of executing a forced entry mission are the amphibious assault, the airborne 
assault, and the allIllobilc assault. 
a. Amphibious Assaull 
The amphibious assault is an amphibious operation that involves 
establishing a force on a hostile or potentially hostile shore rRef. 2: p. 25]. The forces 
involved are initially embarked on naval vessels and may hI;.': transported by surface 
(landing) craft, aircraft (hdiwplers). or a combination of the two. Amphibious forces 
provide the Opt'T.ttional commander substantial-combat power with superior flexibility in its 
employment 
A major assault would require the use of both air and surface means to 
offload in order to build combat power as quickly as possible. Tn standard U.s. Marine 
Corps amphibious operations, a significant portion of the infantry unit comprising the 
ground combat ekrnent (GCE) will tly in aboard helicopters and the remaining infantry and 
heavier combat power (light antlored vehicles, aJtiilery, combat engineers, etc.) wiil come 
ashore at the heach. The two groups can then consolidate and continue to the objective by 
both air and ground maneuver. 
For smaller objectives requiring fewer total forces ashore, helicopter assets 
may be sufficient to conduct the assault. The use of air assets alone provides an increase in 
speed and surprise at the cost of combat power. Traditionally, amphibious raids are the 
only missions which use only aircraft to bring the combat units ashore. The transportation 
of amphibious forces by aircraft alone is very similar to an airmobile assault in both the 
planning and execution For the purposes of this thesis. an amphibious assault implies an 
air and surface oftload. 
II 
b. Airborne Assault 
The airborne assault is characlerizl:d by the use of parachutes to debark 
aircraft over a dcsignated drop zone. In general thc primary threat to an airborne force prior 
to debarking the aircraft is the encmy's air ddense units. The principal advantagc is the 
spe:ed that a very large force can inscrt and consolidate on llil objective. The U.S. Army's 
82nd and JOist Airborne Divisions train to insert as a division, if required. However, there 
is thc added requircment for air supl:riority over the area of opcrations, considering the 
vulnerahility of the largl: transport aircraft needcd. Prior coordination with the air forces 
providing the aircraft and greatcr troop preparation is also required. The mission must 
originate at a suitable airfield which adds to the restrictions of this type: of assault. 
c. Airmobile Assault 
The airmobi le assault differs from the airhorne assault primarily in the 
transports used and the insertion technique. The combat forces are lifted by hclicopter from 
secure areas and transported to the landing zone. This method may require less troop 
preparation and interservice coordination, but the trade-off is the size force that can be iiftl:d 
and the longer time rl:quircd to amass combat powcr on the ground. While air supremacy 
is always desirl:d, helicopters arc capahle of more tactical movement which can enable 
missions undcr less favorable conditions. 
9. Course of Action 
In gl:nl:ral. the term "course of action" implies a plan or schl:me dl:signed to 
accomplish a specific mission . There may be many courses of actions proposed for a 
single mission. Traditionally, the concept of operations is the portion of 11 COA which 
describes how the mission is to be executed and by what type of forces. Courses of action 
arc intentionally broad outlines of the mission that do not delve into detail ed actions hy 
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specific units. Their purpose is to provide a starting puint to evaluate the feasibility, 
supportability, sustainability, and overall tactical soundness of each plan. Once approved, 
a pm1icular COA becomes the hasis for the development of an operation plan or operation 
order [Ref. 2: p. 971. It is important to understand that a cou rse of action is a framework 
for the general scheme of maneuver to accomplish the mission. 
10 . Objectil'e 
Here again, there is a suhtle difference hetween common usage in society and that 
by the military. An ubjective is generally thought to be any goal or desired result. For 
mi litary commanders, an objective is a defined geographi<.:al area whose seizure or holding 
of which is essential to the mission [Ref. 2: p. 27 1]. While maneuver warfare has moved 
comhat ductrine from a terrain based philosophy to one which focuses on the enemy 
forces, the need to determine objectives by anoperational commander remains important 
Taking a hill or seizing a town are not missions in and of themselves, hnt they are valid 
intermediate steps in waging campaigns against the enemy. In many offensive operations, 
anriting the enemy with a minimum of friend ly casualties is one of the primary goals: 
owning territory is not. It is important to add, however, that in the defense, certain terrain 
types can greatly enhance one's ability to fight (e.g., possession of high ground 
overlooking the enemy's only avenne of approach). Since a campaign can often be 
characterized by a cycle of offensive and defensive postures, the seizure uf intermediate 
objectives may be considered a mission even if it is not the ultimate goal. 
For a forced entry mission, the obje<.:tive serves as the area of focus for movement 
and consolidation. Traditionally, the point of entry is not the objective itself. Operational 
Maneuver from the Sea (OMFTS) is the current U.S. Marine Corps philosophy for 
amphibious operations and has incurporated the maneuver warfare doctrine . It is explicit in 
moving away from "ship-to · ~hore movtrntnt" and moving to "ship-to-ohjective 
maneuver". The primary difference lies in the importance of the beach. It is no longer a 
stopping point; rather it is merely a small portion of the path to the objective and sckction 
of the beach is simply a by-product of the selection of the most desired route based on 
enemy strengths and weaknesses. With the capability provided by the Landing Craft, Air 
Cushion (LCAC) and the Assault Amphihious Vehicle (AA V), a Marine Expeditionary 
Force (MEF) is capable of moving a considerable distance inland to an objective 
The selection of a drop zone for airborne missions and landing zones for air mobile 
missions will depend primarily on the Jocation of the enemy units in the vicinity of the 
objective. Since these light units cannot be expected to cover large distances, the entry 
points must bc relatively close to the objective. Additionally, for these two missions, the 
usc of the objective as the actual drop or landing zone potentially provides some level of 
surprise and may initially confuse the enemy; but if the mission is detected or 
compromised. there can be grave results. 
In general, surprise is the crucial element for success in the insertion phase of any 
forced entry missi on. II is here that the assaull force is most vulnerable. Only when the 
force is consolidated on the ground or ashore can it fully defend itself. For this reason, 
most assaults will be supported as much as possible with naval surface fire support, close 
air support, and indirect fire . 
B. COMBAT MODEL TERMS AND TECHNIQut.:8 
The different methods of modeling combat have characteristics which arc 
fundamental in determining the appropriate uses ofthcm. Key terminology for describing 
various Iypes of combat models is described helow. 
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1. Resolution 
The limitations of computer hardware have restricted the current farlliiy of combat 
models into two primary groups. High resolution models represent each individual and 
weapon in a tactical ballie and resolve each shot between the combatants to assess attri tion 
and ultimately determine mission success or failure. At present, high resolution models are 
not usually capahle of modding units Jarger than ballaiion size before becoming 
computationally ovcf\.\'hclmcd. Low resolut ion models aggregate the individuals and 
weapons into units and resolve wmbat engagements using estimates of attrition between 
the units, not the individuals. These attrition estimates may come from high resolution 
model analysis. These models allow larger units to be represented so operational 
procedures can be analyzed and improved. 
Even the capabilities of today's most powerful computers do not allow the 
modeling of a full theater level conflict from the Cine down to the individual soldier. The 
sheer number of variables for this undertaking is staggering. A theater level conflict is the 
result of thousands of individuals interacting at numerous levels. Each individual uses the 
s ingle most powerful processor available (the human brain) to make decisions with 
uncertain information from continually changing conditions, incorporating intui tion. 
(.raining, and past experiences. To recreate all of these factors in any reasonable form 
would stretch not only the limits of the hardware available, but would take years to 
program and execute 10 generate any Significant results. 
Clearly, a complete high resolution model of theater-level combat will not be 
possible fo r m:my years, if ever. As technological improvements are made, lhe unit size to 
which a high resolution model is limited may increase. However, as the level of command 
becomes higher, there are more considerations than just tactical usc of weaponry in a 
given environment. Current high resolution models generally incorporate only rudimentary 
maneuver tac tics At baualion and regimentallevcls, the impact of malleuver becomes 
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much more important. The increasing level of command also brings with it greater concern 
for the operational and strategic influences in combat. 
Despite paring down the realism of a combat model and simulating complex 
processes, a low resolution model can still produce valuable results and insight imo the 
effect of certain decisions or the impact of specific organization or equipmcnt 
Improvements. 
2. Uncertainty 
In rcal combat. thcre are numerous sources of variation; most notably the 
diffcrenccs among human commanders making decisions, equipment effectiveness and 
reliability, and the effect that external factors snch as the terrain and weather can have on 
combatants. In most cases the underlying causes for the external variations arc thcmselves 
complex systems. Their effccts are often appr~ximated in a combat model through the use 
of probability distributions which rcsemble the variations as much as possible. Stochastic 
models allow for the variation in outcomes between different runs of a particnlar scenario 
which attempt to represent the uneenain nature of combat. Detenninistic models are those 
whose outcomes do not change for a given set of the input parameters. 
High rcsolution models freq uently use random processes to model combat at the 
individual level. Weapons will have parameters such as hit probabilities and kill 
probabilities for specific types of engagemcnts. During a run of the model , random 
numbers will be drawn to detennine if a shot actually hit the target and if it subsequently 
killed the target. This is tcrmed a "Monte Carlo" draw and is the simplest form of 
stochastic modeling. Sincc eve1)' run's outcome depends on the sequencing of numerous 
random number draws. the outcomes will vary as long as the numbers are truly random 
and not a reproducible series. JANUS(A) is an example of a stochastic, high resolution 
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model in use by lIIany agencies throughout the Department of Defense and in thc U.S . 
Army. in particular. 
Most of the early theater level (low resolution) models in use by the Department of 
Defense were deterministic, which means they did not allow for random factors 10 affect 
any portion of their execution. As computer technology and model sophistication has 
improved, some stochastic models have been developed. TACWAR is a deterministic 
theater level combat model which is primarily operated by the Warfare Analysis Division 
(WAD) of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and hy the analysis cells of the unified conullllilds . ft is 
a very comprehensive model which includes lube and rocket artillery, aircraft, logistics 
uni ts, and even nuclear and chemical weaponry; but it ignores Ihe uncertain nature of 
combat by using only deterministic algori thms. [Ref. 61 
Concepts Evaluation Model (CEM) i~ aJso an example of a deterministic, low 
resolution modcl , used primarily by the Concepts Analysis Agency (C.i\.i\ ) of the U.S. 
Army. More recent al1empts to make CEM incol"JXlrate um.:ertainty have resulted in a model 
called Stochastic CE.\I1 (STOCEM) with limited results [Ref. 7: p. 15]. The transition from 
a determ.ini ~ tic mode! 10 a truly stochastic mode! involves more than just adding a few 
random processes. Tt was partly for this reason that the Joint Chief~ of Staff, TRADOC, 
and the Naval Postgraduate School started from ground zero in sponsoring the Furme 
Theater Level Model (FTLM) research which has lead to an experimental prototype, called 
JW AEP. lRd. 8: p. 4] 
One of the principal advantages of the explicit representation of uncertainty in 
comhat modeling in an interactive mode is the effect on the users. As Ihey become 
accustomed 10 seeing the "fog of war" on their computer screen. they accept the need to 
make decisions without perfect information and hopefuliy become proficient at it. A great 
shorl<.:oming of models that display ground truth is that they present the decision maker 
with arguably more intelligence information than they would ever have during actual 
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combat. In order to "train like we fight", it seems clear that we must strive to hone those 
skills that will be most frequently used in real combat operations. For the commandcr, this 
mcans making good decisions, even when there is less informatiun available than desired 
and ultimately using uncertainty to his advantage as much a~ possible 
3. Decision Making 
The distinction between a wargame and a simulation stems from the methuo by 
which decisions arc made and the purpose of the exercise. A wargame requires human 
interaction in the form of direct input at diffen::nt points of the conflict. The purposc is to 
evaluate the outcome of the battle as a function of the decisions made and to improve the 
individual decision maker's ability to function under extreme or uncertain situations. 
Lessons can be learned from actions taken in the wargame and insights can be gained into 
how decisions are best made. Wargames are often termed "man-in-the-loop" or 
"interactive" models. Because this type of model solicits information from the user, it is 
inherently stochastic because two separate runs of the wargame will rarely be identical 
unless the user makes identical decisions at exactly the same times. 
True simulations are often termed "systemic" or "closed" models because thcy arc 
designed to have little or no player interaction during a run of the model. The creation of 
the scenario will drive the mooel and thc outcomes can be cumpared as a function of the 
input parameters from the scenario. This can make the comparison between the impact of 
two weapons systems more robust than j ust comparisons of the physical attributes such as 
rate of tirc, maximum, range, etc. Additionally, a well designed systemic model can be run 
interactively, although this changes its purpose from repeatable experimentation to 
exploration. At any point, a decision can be turned uver to an operator rather than having 
the model use its own decision logic 
Combat is a human endeavor and the abili ty to modd it is severely hampered by the 
need to create methodologies to make decisions. Human beings usc methodologies also, 
but. they are not likely to consistently follow them in exactly the same manner time after 
time. Unless there is a mechanism to vary the decision logic, a computer will make the 
same dedsion, given identical inputs. This incongruity makes the creation of systemic 
models a significant undertaking. The integration of stochastic events and systemic 
decision making is the challenge thai faces today's combat models. Both issues have been 
dealt with separately, but until the creation of JWAEP, there were no models that 
completely attempted both. 
C. JWAEP MODEL 
1. Model Description 
The JW AEP model is a systemic, aggregated (Jow-resolution), stochastic combat 
model which uses a network representation of the t.errain and a square grid for airspace, 
and can be operated in an interactive mode. The use of the network structure helped 
distance J\V A..EP from the realm of "piston" representation of combat conanon in older 
models. During the Cold War, a full scale theater battle with the Soviet Army was 
envisioned in Europe. Modelers anticipated a large. linear battle with clearly dctined fronts 
and boundaries. The advent of maneuver warfare brought with it a shift away from a linear 
battlefield to a more nuid and dynamic, non-linear environment. JW AEP's ne twork 
structure makes it fully capable of modeling the complexities of non-linear combat. 
One of the principal advancements made by JWAEP is the incorporation of 
uncertainty into the decision algorithms (Le., using perceptions of the enemy locations and 
actions to drive decisions rather than ground truth) in addition to applying variability to 
outcomes. Much like real combat, these perceptions of the enemy are developed from 
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information collected by Sensors in the mudel, which must thcn be evaluated and converted 
to wlmt is traditionally deemed "intelligence". 
2. Methodology 
Using Bayesian probability updates, the model computes pcrceived enemy strength 
in a particular area (either on a nodc or an arc). Each time a sensor pa~ses over a particular 
area, it "sees" a specific number of encmy armored or motorized vehicles. Given the 
probability of dctection (Pd) for the specific sensor, the model can estimate not only the 
actual number of vehicles in the area, but also the estimate's own variability. The 
information from the next pass by any sensor can be combined with prior sensor pa~ses to 
compute thc most accurate estimate possible. 
From this cstimate of individual elements, a probability distribution of fo rce 
compositions can be determined . By comparing the estimate number of individual 
equipment types to templates of enemy units, the model computes the likelihood that, for 
example, an armor brigade is on node 26 given that 150 tanks arc estimated to be prcscnt 
fro m the sensor readings. This single likelihood is then divided by the sum uf all possihle 
force eomhination likelihoods to compute the probability that there is an annor brigade on 
node 26. Clearly, it is important for an operational decision maker to have as accurate an 
idea as possible of the size and type of a unit un a node even if it is not possible to identify 
the exact unit. 
The JWAEP model currently uses these force composition probability densities on 
the nodes and arcs to generate probability estimates for pre-determined enemy eOA's. The 
COA's are basica!Jy a description of the method by which thc enemy is attacking the 
defemit:r. Eaeh eOA will outline the numbers and types of forces present on principal 
avenues of approach. By comparing the probabilities of eenain unit types on a designated 
avenue of approach, each eOA can be assigned its own prohability using similar likelihood 
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procedures as discussed above. For a more in-depth discussion of the Bayesian updates, 
likelihood estimates, and COA probahility determination in J\V AEP, consult t.he thesis by 
Schmidt [Ref. 9]. 
Some of the significant advances in JW AEP have additional advantages over 
prnious cumbat modds. The use of probability vectors to represent the size and types of 
units present allows the model to realistically account for the impact of anrition on lhe 
perceptions of enemy unit strength. If an enemy division has been heavily attritcd, it may 
appear to be a brigade sized unit, regardless of the command and control structures. 
Instead of being overly concerned with the issue of unit identification, the model accounts 
only for as>.ets that pose a threat to friendly forces. This allows the decision maker to better 
allocate his forces for combat. 
The explicit representation of uncenainty in the fom] of variability of asset estimates 
is also a significant advance in combat modeling. Uncenainty in combat is clearly not an 
all-or-nothing venture. There will usually be a sense of the situation with some level of 
(;Onfidence. By incorporating the estimates of variability in the asset counts, the model's 
algorithms can represen t the abi li ty to make decisions under unccnainty using realistic 
representations of the intelligence normally presented to the maneuver commander. The 
only significant difference is that JW AEP references units by their location and then assigns 
probabilities concerning their lype and size. In real combat, the focus tends \0 be on 
specific units and the uncenainty in determining their location and strength. 
D. ADDITIONAL TERMS 
The major conceptual addition to the JW AEP model for this thesi s is the 
incorporation of four value categories used to describe the significance a unit, facility. Of 
location may have in the context of a theater level conflict These four categories arc 
military, JXIlitical, economic, and social. 
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1. Military 
Military value is the importance a unit, infrastructure, or area can have to the 
military leadership of a nation or other organization, such as a faction, clan, etc, It 
encompasses an ability to locate, move toward, cngagc, and attrite enemy forces or an 
ability to support, supply, sustain, and protect friendly forces. Tn a theater lcvel conflict, 
the destruction ofthc cncmy's military power is the surest ffil:thod of defeat. 
2. Political 
Political value is the importance a unit, infrastructure, or area can have to the 
political leadership of a nation or other organization, such as a faction , clan, etc. It 
encompasses those clements that can affect the government's ability to control thl: nation or 
the military, as well as the rcputation of the government both to its own populacc and to the 
world at large. In a theater level conmct, attacks on the enemy's policy makers can bring 
about a rapid, perhaps only tenuous, end to hostilities. 
3. Economic 
Economic value is the importance a unit, infrastructure, or area can have to the 
economy of a nation or othcr organization, such as a faction, clan, etc. It encompasses 
those elements that maint.ain the smooth flow of goods and tradc as well as their individual 
financial importance. In a theater level conflict, the destruction of the enemy's cconomic 
industry can create long tcrm impact on the country's ability to function properly in an 
economic sl:nse as well as prohibit them from waging war from a financial aspect. 
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4. Socia l 
Social value is the imp0rlance a unit, infrastructure . or area can have on the 
population of tile nation or other organization, such as a faction, clan, etc. II encompasses 
those elements that affect popular opinion, especially toward their nation, its government 
and military. In a theater level conflict, the targeting of socially imJXlrtant entities can 




JW AEP must select and prioriti1.c possible operational objectives in order to issue 
unit orders when operating in the systemic mode. The physicallocalion of the target area 
and its relation to friendly forces will partly determine jf a forced entry mission is feasible 
for that target area. Once feasible target areas have been Scic(;led, they mUSl be ranked in 
order of importance or preference 
A target area's preference can be measured in terms of its value 10 the enemy and 
its significance in the overall friendly campaign strategy. If a target aITa is important to the 
enemy, then it follows that it is desirahle for friendly forces to occupy, control, or destroy 
it. Defining this importance or "value", however, poses great difficulty and will be 
discussed in more detail. For a theater level combat model, value should consider not just 
the military capability present but also any political, economic, or social impor1am.:e at the 
strategic level. 
Thl: significance of a target area with regard to the campaign slrategy can depend on 
many factors. The distance from the target area to till: strategic objective can serve as an 
initial measure of ils importance in the campaign. The extent to which thl: target area 
supports the perceived enemy course of action (COA) could be another. 
To prioriti};e each target area, its overall value and strategic importance should be 
weighcd against the enemy ' s intent to defend against such occupation, control, or 
destruction. A crucial power plant would have inherent value to the enemy; accordingly. 
there wou ld be enemy assets dedicated to defend it. A large enemy unit certainly is a 
valuable larget, but its own dcfenses make it difficult to engage with minimal risk. By 
comparing the total value of a target area to its defensive capability, a relati ve measure of 
prefcrence can be determined for pJioritizalion. 
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To incorporate an objective sekction algorithm in JWAEP, there are specific 
modifications that should be made to the data structures of the input files. Once the 
database contains all necessary information, the feasihility and priority algorithms can 
nominate and rank potential objectives. 
A. SCENARIO DATABASE CREATION 
The battlefield environment and force information are among the principal elements 
of a combat model's scenario. The battlefield environment will contain terrain and 
geographic information while the force information will contain the initial location, size, 
organization, and equipment lists for all of the units. When modeling a specific region, the 
battlefield environment information can be obtained from maps and charts for the theater, 
wltile the force representation will come from current intelligence estimates wltich include a 
consideration of doctrinal employment of th~ forcl:s involvl:d. If analysis of a specific 
region or enemy is not necessary, a notional database could be constructed. 
To compute a measure of value fOf each target area, the geographic components 
which define the target area and any units or structures present must be examined. In 
JW AEP, those geographic components arc the arcs and nodes of the network. Although 
there arc units already present in the model, additional data structures must be addoo which 
represent the infrastructure targets which are commonly targeted in a theater level conflict. 
I . Network Modifications 
a. Center oj Grayity 
The ability to designate a key location or unit as a strategic objective docs 
not exist. in JWAEP. In a theater level conflict the center of gravity for the campaign is 
likely to be the enemy's capital city or seat of political power. This information could he 
added to the network during scenario creation so it can be used during the execution of the 
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model and the objective selection algorithm. The determination of a single strategic 
objective is necessary to focus the di rect ion of the missions assigned to units during lhe 
battle and to assist in sekcting intermediate objectives throughout the campaign. 
b. Beach Terrain 
The incorporation of amphibious forces into IW AEP was initially developed 
in a Master's thesis by LT Mike Fulkerson, USN in September, 1994 [Rd. iOJ. 
Essentially, the <unphibious forces are representl:rJ as ground forces located on "ship" 
equipment types on "sea" nodes that can be detected by the enemy so as to afkct eGA 
perception . Currently the muvement frum ship to shore dues nOl include a specifi c beach 
area or oooe; there are only arcs that connt:Cl sea nodes to ground nodes. A terrain type that 
represents the transition point from water to land must be added to represent those sites 
which allow for a surface offload of amphibious forces. It can also be used to determine 
the distance that the assault force can maneuver inland either by foot or by vehicle. The 
addition of the beach terrain type is a st.arting point for further refinement of the mode l to 
account for the effect of mines ooth in the surf zone and on lhe beach itsclf. in addition to 
the st.andard land and water mines. Mine warfare significantly impacts li ttoral operations 
and must be included in future versions of JWAEP. 
c . Inherent Value 
n le network should also include an interpretation of the importance of the 
nodes and arcs themselves. Each elemcnt can possess military, poli tical, economic, and 
socia l value to the cne my. A specific locat ion on the battlefield may possess inherent 
tac tical valne {Q a mancuver (;ommander. The assignment of this value could be tied to the 
Commander's Preparation of the Battlefield (CPB, also known as Intell igence Preparation 
of the Battlefield or IPH ). The CPB process helps the mancuver commander determine 
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mobility corridors and specific areas of interest in his operation area. If an ace, foc 
example, is considered a high speed avenue of approach (e.g., an open valley), its control 
would have more impol1ance than an area designated "slow-go" or "no-go" (e.g., a densely 
vegetated civer valley). Currently all nodes and arcs havl: terrain types assigned hut they 
are used only for unit movement rate calculations. A fl at terrain type may possess tactical 
or even operational value because it facilitates movement. High ground overlooking a large 
area may have poor traffieability yet could have tactical imponanee a~ it provides excellent 
observation and defensihility. 
rhere may be political, economic, and social value associated with a target 
area even if there are no signifICant infrastructures or military units present. The 
Nuremberg Parade Field was bombed by the Allies in World War II for the sole purpose of 
destroying Hitler's prized marching grounds. Surely it had little military importance to the 
German Army at that point in the war, but the political impact was considered large enough 
to expend ordnance and risk lives. This attempted psychological blow to an enemy's 
military lcader resurfaced in the Persian Gulf War when Coalition air forces proposed 
bombing the statue of Saddam Hussdn. Although it was not actually done, the intent was 
the same [Ref. 11: p.245]. Another example is an agrarian community; it may have 
substantial economic and social impact while having little military or political value. 
The operational eOllllllllnder should have final determination of a target 
llrea's importance. Some form of this infonnation should exist in the CINC's campaign 
plans and since these plans are updated on a regular basis, it seems best to assign the 
importance of nodes and arcs during the scenario construction phase. Each decision maker 
will have a unique interpretation of the meanings of the value parameters as well as his own 
method for assigning actual values to specific e1cml:nts of the network. The algorithm docs 
not constrain the user to any range of values during thl: crealion of the scenario. \Vhi1c it is 
suggested that a scale of 0 to 100 be used for the four value determinations, the use of 
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fractions of the summed values eliminates the need for fixed ranges of values. Two 
absolute requircmcms must be met, however. The first is the need for consistent value 
assignment across all network elements and within cach value category. For examp le, an 
infrastructure target with political score of 40 should be twice as valuable as one with a 
score of 20. The second is a minimum amount of correlation between value parameters for 
a given node, target, or unit. This mcallS that the values assigned should not include 
secondary effects (c.g., if a node has military value, then it has poli tical value because the 
poli(;), makers understand its military importance). The values should be as independent of 
each other as possible. The decision maker should assign them considering only each 
specific value by itself. 
In future work, it lIlay he possible to suggest military values for elements of 
the network during the database construction. For nodes, the key consideratjons could 
include the size, terrain type and number of connected arcs (or degree). For arcs, they 
could im:lude width, terrain type, and size 'of adjacent nodes. The crucial aspect 10 
remember is that these assigned values should not be influenced by any factor.; other than 
the network elements' own characteristics. They should not be dependent on infrastructure 
or perccived enemy forces present. Thesl;.': inlluences will he accounted for separately. 
2. Infrastructure Targets 
Currently, the only possible targets in JW AEP arc military units. On any node or 
are, there may be static infra~tructure present which can be of importance to the enl;.':my' s 
ability to cOllduct the campaign. The same values (military, political, economic, and social) 
can again be used to describe these static targets. Clearly, an ammunition plant would 
possess significant military value to the enemy. The destruction of the plant, or control of 
the area surrounding it, prohihits its usc by the enemy. In some cases, certain 
infrastructures may be advantageous to occupy for future usc by the friendly forces and 
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would not he targeted for destruction ur neutralization hy destructive means. The author 
experienced an example of precisely this com:l:m during Operation Desert Stonn. The 
water desalinization plants in some locations were intentionally not homocd so they (;Quid 
be later used by Cualition Furces, if necessary. In this case, the water purification plants 
had significant military value to both sides for logistical reasons. This situation lends itself 
to occupation of the ubjcctive by forced I:ntry missions because allaek by air assets alone 
may have undesired effects. 
The intelligence ass;::ssmcnt of an enemy's infrastructure is currently part of theater 
level campaign planning in all of the Unified Commands. The static nature of factories and 
other facilities makes the estimak of their value somewhat easier than for non-static 
clements. Comparisons in size, and thert::forc significance, can assist in assigning realistic 
valucs to particular targets such as power plants or leb:ommunieation cenlers. Although it 
can be assumed that enough information will exist prior 10 and during hostilities to identify 
them explicitly, it may be necessary to creale infrastructure target types specifically for 
targeting purposes. The addition of the acluallargd to the ndwork is similar 10 adding an 
additional node or arc. since the infrastmcture is not mubile. 
The parameter assignments for the four value types are made during Ihe creation of 
the scenario. The values must be on the same scale as that of the nodes and arcs (0-100) so 
that they are directly. numcrically comparable. For eXillllple, a railroad yard (infrastructure) 
with a military valuc of 45 should be three times more important than a mountain pass (arc) 
with a military value of 15. The process can rely on both intelligence estimates and the 
operational commander's input. 
The assignment of value by the operational commander is sufficient to us;:: as a 
starting point for the initial construction of this objective selection algorithm. As mentioned 
previously. further investigation can ~ dune in an attempt to incorporate the dynamic 
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assignment of these parameters into JW AEP, if desired. For the purpose of th is thesis, the 
values will be predetermined and input during the scenario generation. 
3. Initial Unit Information 
a. Military value 
The JWAEP model includes . the doctrinal tables of organization and 
equipment (TO&E) for unit types of both forces in the contlie\. At the outset of the 
model's execution, the a(; tuai numbers of t:quipmcnt and personnel arc randumly modified 
to represent the shortfalls or excesses commonly seen in military units. These deviations 
will result in m.:tual unit strength changes that would not be apparent to the planning entities 
of the opponents. Included in the TO&E are the individual weapon systems firepower 
scores. The basic service rifle is assigned a numerical value of 1.0 and all uther weapon 
scores are determined rdative to this. The TO&E is currently ust:d to compute the 
perception probabilities for units un a node and will be incorporatt:d into the de termination 
of both value and defensihility 
The incorporation of additional aspects of a unit's combat effectivcncss is 
currently under devdopment in lWAEP. The initial proposal of aggregated strength 
variables included eateguries of Command, Control, Commun ications and Intell igcnce 
(C31), Attrition, and Logistics [Ref. 12]. Further refinements under developmt:nt include 
additional transport parameters under the Logistics category [Ref. 13 J and a new Mobility 
category which will be concerned with a unit's combat engineer assets [Ref. 14] 
Some of these capability parameters will be directly tied to measurable 
quantities in lWAEP. They will be determined from specific asset counts , much like the 
calculation of the firepower score. For exampJt:, a unit that possesses significant motor 
transport assets will he more capable of sustaining itself logist ically, and its logistic 
strength values should reflect this. Similarly, a unit with combat engineering equipment 
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and personnel attached will have higher mobility and counter-mobility strength than one 
without these assets. 
One proposed strength variable, Command and Control (C2), presents 
greater difficolty in both assignment and subsequent interpretation. Cl strength is not the 
result of reliable communication equipment or doctrine alone. It is closely tied to the 
internal operating procedun:s of the unit and the individuals in leadership positions. 
Leadership, l ike training and morale, can have a tremendous impac t on a unit's 
effectiveness in combat. While these measures arc less quantifiable, they should be 
incorporated into a combat model, if possible. Intclligenee estimates and eumbat history 
can provide some insight into the determination of the parameters and they could then be 
used to enhance or degrade a unit's performance in combat. Again, the need for consistent 
value assignment is imperative given the importance these factors have in real combat. 
The unit strength variables pose a considerable challenge to JW AEP' s use 
of perception based representation of enemy units. It currently does not allow one side to 
"know" or idcntify specific units frum the other. The perception information concerning 
force composition and size classifies uni ts only by the number and type. Additionally. it 
does not provide simply a single unit type with some measure of accumcy (e .g., " there is 
an armor brigade within 500m of grid 123456" or "there is a 75% chance that there is an 
armor hrigade located at grid 123456"). Instead. it prcsents all uf the possibilities of the 
combinations of units which cuuld be prescnt on a spccific node or arc and assigns a 
prohahility to each . As it stands now, the perception database for each side during the 
conflict reaches a substantial size considering only unit types. The aggregation uf units to 
the brigade level has profound impact on the inferences that can be made about the type of 
unit detected by frien dly sensors. Brigades are traditionally composed of many different 
types of equipment and this will hinder the ahility to exactly classify unit types. much less 
specifically identify in dividual uni ts. To generate and keep track of all possible 
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combinations of specific units, as well as computing probllbilities for each, would clearly 
be computationally and numerically overwllelming. Accordingly. the assignment of 
military value will, at present, be restricted to unit types based on generic firepov.'cr scores 
only 
b. Non-mililary Value 
While it is clear that an enemy unit will have lnili!ary value, it may also 
possess some of the other t]lree types of value. The Republican Guard of the Iraqi Army, 
for example, was heavily targeted during the Persian Gulf War. While the principal 
reasons for this were their assignment as Iraq's strategic reserve, their size, and their 
combat reputation, there was an additional benefit gained by their engagement. As Saddam 
Hussein's national security force, the Republican Guard was highly regarded throughout 
Iraq and the damage caused by Coalition bombing had a decided political impact. His 
mainstay force was getting destroyed before engaging in actual combat. The additional 
facets of a military unit's non-military value provide grounds to incorporate additional 
political. social, and economic values for ea(;h units. 
Again the issue of unit specificity in JWAEP poses an obstacle. The 
political, economic, and social values, however, can be assigncd by the operational 
commander for different unit types and sizes. For example, a generic armored division 
would seemingly have more political value than a light infantry brigade. There is the 
possibility thallighl uni ts may be considered differen tly than heavy units by the people of 
the nation. For example. a relatively small insurrection or guerrilla force may have high 
sueial value without much p:llitical, economic, or rnililary valuc 
Tied to the equipmenl table for a unit Iype, the individual cost for each 
equipment type could serve a~ a preliminary measure for a unit type's econoUlic value . A 
technological improvement ill a weapon system lIlay improvl;.': thl;.': individual weapon score 
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and could dramatically increase its price. The difficulty in replacing these newer items can 
increase their desire to he destroycd by the upposition. If a well~equipped, elite unit is one 
of only a fcw uf its kind in existence and it is somehow engaged and destroyed by the 
enemy, then the result is a not unly a military snccess, hm potentially a political, ccunumic, 
and social one 
The difficulty in assigning non-military values to combat units stems from 
thc intcrpretation of psychology on a grand scale. The politicians must perceive a value of 
a tank division in addition to recognizing its inhcrent military value. The economy must 
feci the impact of thc destruction of a high-tech fighter squadron. The operational 
commander needs to anticipate these factors when generating the parameter values during 
the creation of his campaign plan 
This thesis will not further investigatc thc levels and mcanings of thesc 
value parameters for units or other elements in the model. It is imperative to recognize hoth 
their importance and the difficulty of their detemlination .. For now, it is sufficient to have 
the op::rational deeisiun maker provide his input to the model as the starting puinl. 
R. lN1TIAI. FEASIBILITY BY MISSIOK TYPE 
The principal constraint in limiting .which targct areas are candidates for an 
operational forced entry assault is the travel distance rel/uired. An aggressive inscrtion of 
forces into a potentially hustile area demands a viable extraction or withdrawal plan in the 
event that ncither successful consolidation on the objective nor a link-up with friendly 
forces is possihle. The limitations of the transport equipment available will be the principal 
eunstraints. These maximum distances for each mission can serve as an initial fJ1~r of an 
the Ilod~s l.lCcupkd by the enemy in the model. Using a straight-line distanec comparison, 
potential target areas can he screened for further examination. 
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1. Amphibious Assault 
For an amphibious surface assault to an inland objective, the primary concern will 
be the range from the ship to the target area, through the beach. The force must not only be 
able to reach the objective, but also retain the ability 10 withdraw if the mission's success 
becomes unattainable. The size of the assault force will determine how much of an 
offensive, inland push can be achieved while maintaining the requisite defensive security of 
the support lines from the beach to the objective. The maximum distance will primarily he 
a function of the ground transport assets' operating ranges. further analysis of a target 
area's feasihility is possible using algori thms already present in JWAEP. A modified 
Dykstra's algorithm using both distam;c and perceived enemy locations selects routes for 
ground maneuver [Ref. 9: p. 331. It can be used to detennine the route along the nodes 
and arcs of the network to ohjectives wh.ich are within the maximum range limita tions for 
the amphibious assault. There may be a substantial difference between the straight-line 
distam:e between two nodes and the actual distance required to travel between them in the 
network as shown on Figure 2. For the amphibious mission, the range used is the distance 
from the target area to any beach nude 
2. Airborne and Air Mobi le Assault 
The airborne and air mohile assaults have increased risk because they do not secure 
a surface rOUle as they move to the objective. The nature of an airdrop or helicopter 
insertion requires an aircraft extraction or a link-up with ground forces. If the surface route 
to friend ly lines is both lightly defended and short enough for the assault force to execute a 
ground extraction by themselves, then the operational commander would probably not 
choose an airborne or air mubile forced entry mission with its inherent risk over a basic 




Fi~ure 2. Distances Between Two Nodes 
Tht: maximum distance is determined hy the helicopter lransports' operating 
ranges. The range is calculated frolIl [hI: target area to any node not occupied by enemy 
forces capable of supporting the staging and refueling of the helicopter assets. This allows 
for the UM: of a fOI'\lIard anning and refueling point (FARP) in the execution of the Illlssion. 
An additional m::twork distance comparison fOf the ilirbome and ai r mobile assaults 
is not necessary because, in reality, the aircraft can fly thc straight-line path if necessary. 
Although JW AEP uses an air grid where the movement is between the centers of the grids, 
this additional constraint would not be present on the battlefield. 
The primary concern at this step is the distance feasibility detennina{ion of each 
target area, not the specific route to be traveled. The purpose of these screening steps is to 
nLinirnize the number of nodes for which the calculation-intensive value and defensibility 
determinations arc made 
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C. VALUE PARAMETER 
1. Military Value 
The military value of a particular unit should reflect its combat power and will 
primarily depend on its size and composition. The operational decision maker will not have 
exact counts of assets for specific units; instcad, he will have a situation map with 
intelligencc cstimatcs of enemy unit types. JWAEP contains this information in the 
perception probability array for each node. A generic firepower score for each unit type 
can be computed using the TO&E equipment counts and each individual equipment' s 
firepower score 
where 
GFP, = I. Wj"'ij 
"l 
GFP i =- generic firepower score for unit type j 
w j = firepower score for weapon type} 
"" 1 = number of weapon type} in unit type i 
(1) 
Throughout this thesis, the indices used are defined as follows · 
unit type, (e.g .• armor brigade. mechanized infantry brigade. ranger 
regiment. etc.) for both sides engaged in the conflict. 
weapon type, (c.g., T -62 tank, RPK-74 machine gun. M 16 service 
rifle. etc.) for both sides engaged in the eonOict 
targt:t area: a specific node or arc that elm have military units andior 
infrastructure present. 
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I - specitic infrastructure (e.g., a power plant, a teleeonununications 
center, a ammunition factory, ctc.) throughout thc the..1ter. 
mission type - amphibious or airborne/air mobile. 
value type - military, politicul, economic, and social. 
It is imponant to add that these firepower scores are to be used (0 provide a basis 
for a~signing military value, not for the adjndication of combat. 
The perception database allows the algoritbm to detennine the expected enemy unit 
firepower score fo r each target area hy multiplying the probability of eao::h unit composition 
by its appropriate generic firepower score. 
where 
E[FPkl == I pj,k GFP j . 
., 
E[FPd =0 expected total firepower in target area k 
pj,k = perccption probability of unit type i in target area k 
GFP j = generic firepower score for unit type i (from Eqn. I) 
(2) 
Since hundreds of weapons are present in a brigade sized unit, these expected 
target area flTepower scores will be substantially larger than the military value of the target 
area and any infrastructure targets, as well as the other value parameters (political, 
economic, and social) of the targct area. To ovcrcome this order of magnitude problem, 
cach target area's unit firepower score is nomlalized by the sum of all nominated target area 






The target area's inherent military value and all of its infrastructure's military value 
can be directly added to fOIlB a measure of static military value. 
where 
StatMilk = TgtAreaMilk + L InfraTgtMilk ,J 
VI 
StatMilj; = total static military value in target area k 
TgtAreaMilk = inherent military value of target area k 
InfraTgtMilk.[ = milIary value of infrastructure I ill target area k 
(4) 
Each target area's static military value is also normalized by dividing by the sum of 
all the target areas' static military value. 




A target area's overall military value is a combination of both the expected 
firepower score and the static military value. Since both values have been nonnalized, a 
weighted sum can be used to provide a single measure. 
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where 
a l = weight given to firepower estimate 
a 1 = weight given to infrastructure and area inherent milital)" value 
The relationship hetween 0: 1 and 0.2 rcpresents thc operational cOJilmander's 
relative importance of the target area's total unit firepowe r scores to its fixed military value. 
If, for example, he felt that military units are three times as important as infrastructure and 
area inherent values, the assignments for a1 and 0:2 would he 0.75 and 0.25, rcspectively. 
Hence, this could also serve to represent the difference between campaign goals of 
destroying thc enemy's mililary and defeating thc entire nation. 
2. Non-Military Value 
The non-military values are added in the same fashion as the military valuc. Despite 
not having the numcrieal magnitude problem for military units' values because the range for 
all the non-military values is fixed, thcre arc perception probabili ties to address. Since each 
unit type has different political, economic, arid social importance, an expected value for 
each can be computcd in a similar manner as the expected firepower score. The following 
equations specifically outline the procedure for the computation of the political value of a 
target area. The process is identical for both the economic and social values, as well. 
E[PoIVal k 1 = L Pi.k PolVali (7) 
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whcre 
E[PolValk 1 '" expected total military unit political value in target arca k 
P,.k = perception probability of unit type j in targct area k 
PolVal i '" generic political value for unit type i 
The expected unit political value of each target can also be normalized hy the total 
unit political value in all the nominated target areas 
(8) 
The static political value of the target area and the infrastructure present can be 
added together without any modification because they should be on a consistent, 
comparahle scale. 
where 
StatPolk = TgtAreaPol k + L infraTgtPolk,/ 
StatPol j '" tOlal static political value in target areaj 
TgtAreaPoli = inherent political value oftargct areaj 
lnfraTgtPol j .k =0 political value of infrastructure k in target areaj 
(9) 
Each target area's stalic political value is normalized by dividing by the sum of all 
the target area's stat ic political value 
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A large! area's overall political value is a combination of both the cxpecteJ military 
unit political value and the static political value. Since hath values have already been 
normalized, another weighted sum can be used to provide a single measure of political 
value 
NonnComhPoik = (II (NomlPolVa1d + (12 (NormStatPo]k) (11) 
where 
a] = weight given to estimate of military unit political value 
a2 '" weight given to infra~tructure and inherent area political value 
The cocfticicnts, a1 and 02, are the same weights used before in the military value 
computation. For now, the operational commander should he consistent in the relative 
importance of military units to the infrastructure and target area, regardless of the specific 
value being measured. Future enhancements of the algorithIIllIlight include separate pairs 
of importance weights (a 1, a2) for each of the four value types. The relative weights of 
the four value parameters will be addressed later 
Each of the three non-military value calcu lations outlined above will produce a 
comhined measure of the fraction of iliat value over all the possible target areas like the 
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military value calculations. These four combined values can be further reduced into a 
single measure which represents the fraction of total value of a given target area compared 
to all the other target areas. 
NormTotalValk = PI (~ormCornbMil*) + Ih (NormCombPoJkl 
+/3] (NonnCombEconkl + /34 (NormComhSOCk) (l2) 
where 
v = Mil, Pol, Econ, or Soc 
The fJ coefficients n::present the relative importane!;.': that the operational decision 
maker places on each of the four Iypes of value. If he feels that military value is twice as 
important as each of the other vaJUI:s (equally weighted). then the cocfticients would be 
OA, 0.2, 0.2, and 0.2, respectively. Tltis further allows the algorithm to focus on the 
priorit ies of the operational cOlllmander. Thl;.':se wefficicnts need not be constant 
throughout the entire execution of the model. As the campaign moves from one phase to 
another, these priorities may ehange 10 reflcct the different goals of each phase 
The final result is that fraction of all the perceived enemy assets, infrastructure, and 
inherent value located in the specific target arca. Clearly, the higher the final numbcr is 
compared to other target areas, the more appealing it is to the operational commander. 
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D. STRATEGIC IMPORTANCE PARAMETER 
In a major regional contingency (MRC), there is likely to be a defensive phase 
where U.S. forces arrive and consolidate prior to attempting to go on the offensive to 
return the country to the status quo. Once the friendly forces begin an offensive campaign, 
the strategic objective becomes the point toward which they will move, either din:ctly or 
indirectly. There will be many factors which detennine the importance of a target area in 
the campaign plan. They can include the effect of the target area on the ability to conduct 
further offensive operations. the impact on the probable course of action (COA) being 
executed. and the overall impact on the conflict. For the purpose of this thesis, the 
principal consideration will be the distance of the target area to the strategic center of 
gravity. A target area in close proximity to the strategic objective is assumed to have more 
appeal in a operational forced emry than one which is very far away from it. Of course, it 
is possible that a more appealing target area may have more enemy located there, since it 
likely that the enemy center of gravity would be well defended 
At the beginning of every opcrational maneuver plilllning cycle in JW AEP, a basic 
calculation of the distance from the strategic objective to the closest friendly unit is 
calculated. For each target area nominated for evaluation, the distance to the strakgie 
Objective is also determined as shown in Figure 3. 
The ratio of the target area's disl;lllce to the strategic objective (StratDistk) and the 
distauce between the closest friendly ground unit lllld the strategic objective (MaxStratDisl) 
represents the relative improvement gained in moving forces closer to the strategic 
objective. 















.Figure 3. Target· Area Locations 
If a target area is mure distance fmm the center of gravity than the distance from the 
closest friendly unit , the ratios arc then determined using this new maximum distance to 
friendly forces , Even though the value of the strategic importance parameter is re~tricted 
between 0.0 and 1.0, the implication is not the samc as for previous parameters. The ratio 
is not based on the sum of the distances from all target areas so the fractions will not sum to 
1.0. However, comparisons betwecn different target areas can still be made because a 
common maximum value is used. 
Each target area' s distance parameter has a negative correlation with its preference. 
Seizing an objective that is close !O the friendly forces docs not gain much strategic 
advantage; however, the normalized value from the distance calculation is cio&c to 1.0. 
Similarly, the strategic objective itself would have a distance value of 0.0. Because the 
maximum value is 1.0, the result can he subtracted from 1.0 to give a more tradit iunal 
45 
meaning to the results. This way, a 1.0 is given to the strategic ohjcctivc itself, and a 
number close to 0.0 would appear for target areas near friendly forces . 
E. ENEMY DEFENSE PARAMETER 
If a target area has sobstantial inherent value and significant infrastructure value to 
the enemy, it is reasonable to assume that they may take steps to defend it by positioning 
combat forces in the vicinity. Only military units or their equipment are capable of attriting 
friendly forces, therefore the estimates of the defensive capability in a target area will be 
solely a function of the perceived enemy forces locatcd there. The method used to 
determine this defensive capability is somewhat different than that used to determine the 
military value of the target area. The perception database presents the operational 
commander with a distribution of possible units in the target area, hut the underlying asset 
counts for each target area provide a better basis for the calculations. The defensibility 
parameter relies solely on equipment counts, so no additional parameters (i.e., the unit 
type's political, economic, or social value) need to he considered 
Three additional facton; must be considered for the estimate of enemy defensibility. 
The flrst concerns the dynamic nature of enemy units in a combat zone. Between the time a 
target is nominakd until the mission orden; are sent and the execution begins, enemy forees 
may move to new locations. The second concerns the actual weapons that IIlay be used by 
the enemy to defend against the assault force. ' The weapon systems that severely threaten 
an airborne or air mobile forced entry mission may not have the same impact on a surface 
amphibious assault The third factor is the uncertainty in the underlying asset counts, 
themselves . 
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1. Enemy Movement 
The possibility that additional enemy units may move into thc larget area can be 
predicted somewhat by an operational decision maker if accurate and timely intelligence 
reports allow him some ability to track their movement. However, the single snapshot of 
enemy unit perception probabilities used to compute mili tary value and defensibility does 
nol enahle the aJgorithm to predict movement between thc planning cycles. Therefore, a 
logical method to account for this potential build-up of enemy comhat power in thc target 
area is to include all enemy units within a certain distance of the target area. While aU of the 
units in [he vicinity will probably not move to that single area. they do have the putcntiaJ to 
threaten the success uflhe mission if they are indeed present at the ti ll)e of execution or can 
quickly move to engage the assault force once the mission begins. Enemy force s should be 
expected to attack as quickly as possihle, once aware of the friendl y mission. in order to 
engage rhe assault fo rce before it can fuJly consolidate on the objective. By considering all 
uni ts within a certa in range of the ohjeetive, a commander can obtain a con servat ive 
estimate for the relative density of enemy units that may he encountered near a specific 
target area. 
2. Weapons Threat To Specific Mission Types 
The weapons possessed by the perceived units in and around the target area arc 
included in the defensihility parameter for that target area only if they po,se a direct threat to 
the assault force during the assaul t. This restrictiun does not change the military value 
calculations described earlier, since the firepower scores represent gcneral military value to 
the enemy forces and are not situation dependent. The use of all of their assets in a specific 
defensive scenario, however, may not be effective; not every weapon Iype should 
necessarily contribute to the defensibility parameter. For example, the presence of an air 
defense artillery battery would have marc impacI on the estimate of defensibility fOf an 
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airmobile assault th<ln for <l surface amphibious assault. The battery would still havl: 
military value to both missions but would present serious threat only tu the airmobile 
assault force. Although the air defense battery could inflict damage on aircraft supporting a 
surface amphibious assault and may slow its progress, it wuuld probably not attritc thc 
assault force significanlly. It is important to clarify that the defensibility factor will include 
only those unit and equipment typ;;s which can pose a direct threat to the force attempting to 
seize the objective; it is nO! intended to include all combat power. 
3. Asset Count Uncertainty 
In addition to the intentions of the enemy, a wrrunander must consider the accuracy 
of the intelligence estimate of the distribution of enemy forces. The inherent uncl:rtainty of 
information on the battlefield leads to thl: use of more conservative estimates of the 
defenses prl:sent. If therc is greater variabilityin the estimate of enemy combat power in a 
particular target area, there should a relative decrease in the overall desirability of the target 
area. By incorporating the variability of the assets counts computed by JW AEP with each 
sensor update, this uncertainty can be taken into consideration in priori tizing the target 
4. Computation Of Defensibility 
A defensibility asset count for each target arl:a is computed by adding together all 
the asset counts for the target areas that are within range as described previously. The asset 
counts are estimated from thl: sl:nsor returns for each Larget area. If the numher of assets 
sensed, S. is considered to be binomially distributed with a probability of detection, Pd; 
then the I:stimatcd number of a.~sets at the target, N, and the I:stimated variance of that 
estimated numocr are given as: 
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- S N =-
I'd 
(14,15) 
If there have been enough sensor passes, the Central Limit Thl:orem justifies the 
assumption that the accumulated estimate, N, is normally distributed. It is then possible to 
compute a (100-0.)% upper confidence limit for the number of assets in and around the 
target area 
This technique allows the dl:eision maker 10 take a morc conservative approach to 
the estimatl: of the defenses present by using a (100 0.) percentile o f the distribution of N 
rather than using the expected vaiul:s. 
where 
Def k,m = defensibility parameter for Wrget area k and ntission m 
d . = [1, if weapon typej defends against mission m 
j.m 10, ifnOI 
w j = flfepower score of weapon Iype j 
(Hi) 
k' = all nodes and ares within the defensibility range of Iill"get areak 
N j,k' = estimated number of weapon typl: j in the region k' 
Var(N j.e) = eSlimated variance ofN j.e 
The defensibility parameter can also be normalized by dividing by the total 







This represents the fraction of all enemy [on;t:s that call threaten a specific mission 
type. The higher thc fraction, the greater the risk of the mission. Again, a transformation 
is desired to maintain the relationship between increasing parameter values and increasing 
desirability. Subtracting thc defensibility parameter from 1.0 accomplishes this , just as it 
did with the strategic importance parameter. 
F. RELATIVE DESIRABILITY 
(n ord!;.':[ to arrive at a single value by which to detennine the most preferred target 
area for the forced entry assault, the three parameters of value, strategic importance, and 
defensibili ty must be combined. Since all three parameters have been converted to a scale 
of 0.0 to 1.0 with increasing preference for each, they can be modified using bask lIIility 
equations to morc rcal istically represent the importance of the different specific values of 
each parameter. 
1. Utility Theory 
Utility theory provides a framework from which to measure the importance of one 
parameter over another. It also incorporates the ability to discriminate between the 
importance of values or rangcs of values for a given parameter. Essentially it is a 
mathematical tool to represent Ihe importance of outcomes and the risks involved. A lincar 
utility curve for a parameter would imply that each increase in the measure of interest will 
produce proportional increascs in the utility or importance o f the outcome. Traditional 
utility cnrves ass ign a value orQ,Q at the minimum value of the measure of interest and 1.0 
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at the maximum. Having transfonncd the parameters to [0, 1] ranges, they may be fi t into 
many classes of equations that contain the points (0.0) and (1.1), The most flexible of 
these are polynomials of the fonn: 
(l8) 
where 
U(x) :: the utili ty of x 
n ::: llily number greater than 0 (not including 0) 
If n is Jess Ihllil 1.0, the curve is convex (concave down) and represents "risk 
adverse" behavior, Increases in the lower rllilgcs of x will have greater impact on the utility 
than those in the higher ranges. If n is greater than Ilhe curve is concave up and the term 
'"risk preferring" applies Figure 4 shows the basic shapes of both of these types of 
U(x) U(x) 
Risk Preferring Risk Adverse 
n> 1.0 n < 1.0 
Figure 4. Basic ~tility Relationships 
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In general, the utility equation for all of the value parameters should tend to be 
somewhat "risk adverse". This observatiun is nut as obvious as it may sound. Clearly an 
operational decision maker will weigh the benefits of a mission against the risks: and this is 
captured when the utilities of the parameters are finally combined into a single parameter. 
Pur each individual parameter, however, the utility across the range of values requires more 
careful investigatiun. Tn reality, many, if not most, utility curves are neither linear nor 
singularly convex or concave as shown in Figure 5. 
U(x) 
00""""------------'-
Figure 5. ealistic tility Cune 
At the lower values of the parameter, slight increases in the nonnalized values will 
produce litt le gain in utility. As the mea.~ure of interest moves into the middle range of its 
values, slight increases produce greater utility increases until a point is reached at wttich the 
increase in ut ility slows. 
In general, the values for the three paramete~ will be in the range ncar 1ft, where t 
is the number of target areas being considered by Ihe algorithm. Tf t is very large then the 
normaliLed values will tend to be found al the very low end of the range. Choosing a risk 
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adverse utility fum.:t ion will spread the values at the low end. The utili ty curves for the 
operational decision maker will nccd to be created during thc scenario construction 
2. Combined Utility Equation 
Once the util ity for each parameter of a given target area has been computed, a 
weighted sum can create a ti na! mcasurc of utility that the targct area has to the decision 
maker. 
Total UtilitYk,m '" rlU(NormTotaIVald+ r2U(l StratImPt) 
(19) 
+ Y3U(l- NonnDeft,m) 
The coefficients of the utilities of each of the parameters are not required to sum to 
The parameters of strategic importance and defensibility have been subtracted from 
one to convert them to standard Ulility inputs. Since the strategic importance parameter is 
not a fraction ofthe total importance and the defensibility parameters (the wmplcmcnts of 
the fraction of the total defenses) do not add to 1.0, constraining the ,(eoefticients is neither 
necessary nor beneficiaL The relative size of each of the coefficients allows the operational 
decision maker to represent the importance he places on each. A risk taking commander 
may place more emphasis on the value and strategic importance parameters, whi(;h may 
lead to the selection of heavily defended target arcas. A more cautious cOTlunander may be 
more conccrned with avoiding the enemy and might not achieve success in lhe goals of the 
campaign. The Total Utility for each target area/mission combination will not be 
constrained to values between 0.0 and 1.0 (In fact, they will range from 0.0 to the sum of 
the three parameter coefficients, '(1 + 12 + "(3). 
Once the total utility Im.s been computed for all eligible ta rget areas, the one with the 
highest value can be designated as a forced entry mission objective. The sim.ple 
53 
detennination of highest output utility value may not be suitable to decisively choose only 
one, as the values may be close to one another. A threshold of advantage over the next 
most appealing target area may be established to single out only one objective. Jf the 
threshold is not met, then the algorithm can either designate the highest target areas within a 
certain range as potential objectives or it can wait until a single target area has a decided 
advantage. 
Ultimately, the objective selection algorithm will then hand this objective off to the 
appropriate mission planning module that can detennine the mission's overall feasibility, 
based on a more thorough evaluat ion of the perceived enemy forces in the region 
surrounding the objective. The planning module should estimate the attrition expected and 
should choose the optimal route to the objective based on both attrition and distance. 
Current work is being done in a Master's Thesis by Capt. George Po inton, USMC, to 
create this type of planning module for a heliborne amphibious assault [Ref. 15 j. 
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IV. RESULTS AND ANALYSIS 
A. PU RPOSE 
In order to test the basic operation of the algorithm, a small network with 
infrastructure and military units was created so that the outputs could be easily verified. 
The highly subjective nature of both the prerJt':tcmlined value parameters (military, political, 
elc.) and thl: weights in the primary equations (a's, Ws, etc.) renders an in-depth analysis 
difficult, to say the [east. The primary goal of the analysis perfooned is to check the basic 
soundness of the algorithm. By evaluating a small set of units and infrastructure in a 
spreadsheet formulation of the algorithm, the decision logic output can be wmpared against 
a "common sense" solution. The spreadsheet mooel is available upon request from Dr 
Sam Parry or LTC Mark Youngren at the Naval Postgraduate School. 
n , SC ENARIO 
A four node network with nvc ares, ~even infrastructure facitities, and eight combat 
units serve as the baseline scenario. The network and locations of the infrastructure and the 
military units are shown in Figure 6. The process of screening nodes and arcs for 
maximum range limitations is a straightforward calculation. For this scenario, it is 
a~sumed that the 4 nodes and t arc are the only elements with enemy units or infrastructure 
located on them that were not filtered out of the initial target area screening process. 
Table 1 lis t~ the table of equipment and firepower scores for the unit types 
necessary for this scenario. The firepower scores in the second column an: Lhe author's 
estimates of the relative effectiveness of each weapon system compared to a service rifle 
with base value equal to 1.0. The equipment totals under each unit type (Armor Bde, BMP 
Bde, etc.) arc slightly modifled doctrinal unit equipment allocations of the forttler Soviet 
Army from an unclassified source [Ref. 16] 
55 
A D 
- Annor Brigade 
-BMPBrigadc 
- BTR Brigade 
- Infantry Brigade 
- lnfrastroctureTargel 




3D 16 133 
BTR-GO W 5 6 167 
152mm SP 0 
122mm SP 35 18 18 0 
120mmM 35 6 
ZSU-23-4 18 18 6 
SPG-9 10 0 6 36 
RPG-\6 146 150 
10 30 30 4j 
SA-9 , 0 
102 iii 
I ) 145 2225 D15 
Table 1. Table of Equipment 
Table 2 lists thc valuc parameter assignments [or the flye network clements. These 
would be determined hy the operational decision milker or his staff at the outset of the 
scen<lrio creation. Table 3 shows the infrastructure targets and their associated val ue 
parameter assignments, also done during the scen<lrio creation. 
M ilitarv 10 
Politic~ l 10 15 10 
Economic 10 L5 
Social 5 
Distance to 
SUllte 'ic Db 190 245 J.~S 
Ta ble 2_ Network Value Parameters and Strategic Distances 
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w.'" Oil .- Brid ~ RR .. TeleComm 
Location N"",C 
~ 90 30 " 60 20 20 20 35 10 20 30 " 30 50 15 10 45 30 10 15 20 10 15 30 
"able J. Infrastructure Value Parameters 
C. ALGORITHM RESULTS 
1 . Initial Coefficient Analysis 
The first series of runs of the spreadsheet model were done using coefficients at 
their extreme values. For. each equation, fixing one o f the coefficients at 1.0 and the 
remaining at 0.0, will generate target area preference based on only one characteristic. For 
example, if the only criterion for selecting the objective is the military value of the 
infrastructure and target area alone, then the p~rameters ai, ~1' and Yl (in Equations 6,12, 
and 19) should be assigned values of 1.0 and all others should be zero. For the first set of 
outputs, the probability of detection is fixed at 0.8 for all target areas and linear ut ili ty 
(n=I.O) is used for the (hree parameters. 
Given (his situation, the output ranking (first to last) for the target areas is: Node 
A, Node C, Node D, Node B, and then Arc I (Table 4). Clearly, the thrce infrastructure 
targets on Node A (especially the ammunition factory with a military value of 90) make it 
more desirable than the others. There is no di fference between the final uti li ty output 
values and rank ings for the two mission types, amphibious and ai rborne/air mobile, 
because the defensibi lity parameter values are not considered. 
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Mili tary Political Economic Strategic 
"' "' 
.. 
" " " 
y' Y' y3 ,3 




Output: 0.n05 0.0315 0 .3312 0.0946 0.022 1 
Amphib 1 . , 3 5 
Output · o.nos O.OJ IS 0.3312 0.0946 0.0221 
, 3 5 
Tab e 4. Ixed M Itary alue Uutput 
Similarly, if (he operational commander were only concerned with avoiding encmy 
defenses then both of the '(J coefficients (one for amphibious assault and one for airborne 
and air mobi le assaults) would be equal to 1.0. The values for the 0. and ~ coefficients to 
detennine value do not matter because the ovef""d lJ value coefficient, ",(I, is 0,0. The output 
ranking for this cri terion is: Node D. Node C. Node S, Node A, and .hen Arc 1. (Table 5) 
"' 03 
Military Political Economic Social Strategic Defen$e 
a2 111 112 113 !i4 
O . ~ 0 . 2~ 0.25 0.2 5 0.25 
y' 
o 





Output 0.7445 0.7996 0.8373 0.7064 
Rank 3 2 S 







Upon first inspection, Arc I seems to have the same defensiw forces present as 
Node D, hut the inclusion of forees within 50 km of Arc I brings in the units from Node A 
and Node D. For the same reason, Arc 1 's infantry hrigade is included in both Node A and 
Node D's defensihility totals, The two infantry brigades considered for Node Dare 
preferred to thc infantry brigade and BTR brigade at Node C. It bears nOling that the 
values of defensibility seem misleadingly dose because thcy have been suhtractcd from 
1.0. Thc true defensibility values (for which lower scores are preferred) are in the range 
from 0.084 for Node D to 0.295 for Arc L Node e's value of 0.159 is almost twice that 
of Node D. It is clear tbere is a suhstantia] difference. Utility functions can provide some 
assistance in resolving the prohlem of the comparison of complements and will he 
discussl:d in more detail. 
There are seven additional comhinations for thc valuc-only considerations and onc 
for strategic importance. Their results are shown in Tahles 6 through 13. Each of thc 
algorithm's rankings conforms to the intended outcomes which were dcsigncd into the 
structure of thc scenario. For each of these initial tests, each nodl:'S simulated sensors' 
probability of detection, Pd, was kcpt constant at 0.3 and the utility cquations of the value, 
strategic importance, and defensihility wcre lincar with thl: powers in Equation 18 equal to 
1.0 
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fixed Military Polilkni uonomic Strategic 
"' "' " " " " " 
y' yY 
"" , 0 , , 0 , 0 0 0 
Amphib 
Output 0.2105 0,2105 0_026J 
I\mph ib 2 , , 
Output 0.2105 0,2 105 
. 2 2 , 
Tab e o. ixed Po itical Value Output 
Milit ary Politica l Economic Strategic 
"' 
", 
" " " " 
y' y' y3 y' 
, 0 0 0 , 0 , 0 0 0 
Am ph ib 
, 
Out[lllt 0 .0862 0,0345 
Amphib , , 
(}ctpu t: 0.431 0_ 0862 0. 1897 0_0345 
, , y , 
Table ixed Economic Value Output 
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Military Political Economic Strategic 




0 0 a c , , c c C 
Amphib 
Output O,343M 0.1563 0.2 1SM 0 .25 0 .0313 
Amphih , 4 3 , , 
Output 0,1563 0,2188 0 .25 0 .0313 
, 4 3 , , 
T. Ie H. Fixed Social a ue Output 







C , a c a , a 0 0 
Amphib 
Outrmt 03626 0,2798 0.0655 
Amphib , , , 
Output 0 .2198 0 .2184 0.0655 
, , 3 , 4 
Tab e Unit Military a ue Output 
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Military Plllitic.1 &onomic Strat~gic 
"' 
or p, P' P' P' 
" 
r' 
" " 0 , 0 , 0 0 , 0 0 
Amphib 
, 
Output 0 , ] 832 0.069M 
Amphib 3 , 
Output 0 .3141 0 , ] 832 
, 2 3 , , 
Table 10. Unit Political Value )utput 




3' P' r' l' ,3 




Output· 0 .3424 0 ,1 284 0.0761 
Amphib 2 3 , 
Output 03424 01284 0 ,076] 
, 2 3 , 
Table 1. mt i!:conomlC au, utput 
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Milita ry Political Ecooom ic Slrategi~ 
"' "' " 
'2 ,J 'J 
" " 
) 3 ,3 
0 , 0 0 0 , , 0 0 0 
Amph ib 
, 
Output 0.2354 0.2228 
Amphib , 2 
Output 0.2354 0 . 1~75 0. 162 
, 3 J , 
Table 12. UOlt oda alue uutput 
Milit.ry Polit ical Economic Stnucglc 
"' 0' 0' '2 '3 'J " ,2 )3 ,3 0.' 0.' 0.25 0.25 0 .25 0.25 0 , 0 0 
Amphib 
, 
Output · 06389 0 .5417 
Amphib , 2 
Output 0 .3194 
, 5 
'able u. Strategic Output 
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2, Additional Coefficient Analysis 
After continuing that the algorithm behaves properly at the extremc values for the 
coefficients, additional runs of the algorithm wcre made to further investigate the generatcd 
rankings in different situations. Initially, a set of weights that assigns equal preference for 
all the equations were used. The original detection probabilities and the utility curve 
exponents wcre not changed for this example. Using this balanced set of priorities, the 
resulting rankings are: Node D, Node A, Node C, Node I, and then Node B (Table 14). 






" 0.3 0.25 025 0 .25 0.25 , , , , 
Amphib 
OuTput 1, 5967 1,3061 ).4745 
Amphi b , 3 , 
Outpu t 1,5996 [, ) 1 13 1.4723 1.3 148 
2 5 3 I 4 
'able 14. t<.;qua weight Uutput 
The choice of Node 0 seems reasonahle de~pite having only one infrastructure 
target present because there are only two regular infantry brigades available for its defense. 
Node 0 is also the closest objective to the strategic objective which increases its desirability 
over the others. The next best choice, Node A, was the heavily concentrated node. The 
higher static and unit values are offset hy the higher defensibility parameter. Node B was 
heavily defended and had little value so its lowest preference is as anticipated. The only 
unanticipated result was Arc I, which was mnked fourth ahead of Node B. There was no 
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infrastructure target on the arc, but the relative value of the infantry brigade compared to its 
own defenses was more important than the units on Node B, even with the bakery present 
If a maneuver commander were to focus only on enemy combat forees, then the 
unit military value and its defenses would be the only concerns, The set of coefficients 
representing this priority scheme produce the outputs given in Table is. The ranking of 
target areas is : Node A, Node B, Node C, Node D, and Arc I. The differences between 
the values are relatively small and bring into consideration the importance for establishing 
criteria for delennining the impoltance of the difference between the values, 
Military Political Economic Strategic 
., 
" " " " " " " 
,; 
, , 0 0 
" 
, 0 , , 
Amphib 
, 
omput 1.074 1 1.0H9 
Amphib , ; 
Output' l.l071 1,0793 
Table 1 . Umt Mi ltary a ue and Ue ensl I Ity Uutput 
In this case, the three higbest values are within 5% of each otber. There arc two 
ways to handle this situation. The first would be to conclude that any of the three are 
equally preferred and all three should be nominated for further planning. While this may 
more be time consuming for the model, the result may be separate attrition estimates that 
more clearly delineate a single ohjective. The alternative would he to conclude that since no 
clear advantage exists. the algorithm should not nominate any objective until there are 
significant differences between the output values. Logically, for any number of units, the 
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military value, which comes from the equipment only, will be counteracted by the 
defensive capability of that same equipment, This explains why the outcomes are similar 
and a clear decision is not inunediately obvious, 
3 . Detection Probability Anal ysis 
The formulat ion of the defensibi lity parameter for each node or arc depends 
somewhat on the accuracy of the sensor (Pd) assigned, As discussed earlier, the model 
computes the expected asset count and the variance of that estimatc in order to compute the 
perception probabilities for unit combinations in the target area, The variance of the 
number of assets represents the uncertainty of the information provided from the sensor 
and should be considered when detennining the objective, As the probability of detection 
decreases, the variance increases. This will drive the upper limit of the estimate of the 
assets higher, causing an decrease in the defensibility parameter. This, in tum, would make 
thc target area less desirable - a result consistent with the idea that uncertainty is generally 
unappealing in decision making. Tables 16 shows the results of decreasing the detection 























aOie I , v etecbon ro a m Ity utput 
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,3 
" , , 
Amphib 
, 
The ranking of the nodes did not change and, more surprisingly, the final utility 
output values changed only very slightly. The minimal effect is most likely a result of two 
conditions. First, Node D has the least military equipment present even when Arc I' s 
brigade is included. The increase in estimated numerical strength on Node 0 (from 
Equation 19) has little impact on the percent of total defenses and the final utility output 
value. Second, the anticipated impact of this uncertainty may be larger than the true, 
statistical impact. The algoritlull computes the 95% upper confidence limit of the estimated 
number of assets on a given node. Thc difference between a higher detection probability of 
0.8 and a lowcr one of 0.3 would clearly produce numerical diffcrences. but these 
diffcrences do not have substlUltial impact on thc full computation of desirability. 
An operational decision maker might completely rule out a potential objective if he 
was aware of the high level of uncertainty. This consideration is tied to a sense of 
reliahility of the sensor. If there is not enough reliahle infonnation , a commandcr may 
dccide there is too much risk in t hc unknown situation and avoid it altogether. Thc 
statistical techniques in the algorithm account for the errors, regardless, and in the final 
analysis, the values do not change significlUltly given the weights lUId utilities used. 
To further investigate these results, extreme values of the detection probahilities 
were used to see if significant changcs in the total utility output values or. possibly. a 
change in ranking would be ohserved. Table 17 shows the result of using a detection 
probability for Node D of 0.01 while the others were set at 0.99. While the rankings did 
not change. the final utility output values change noticeably from those in Table 16. 
Recognizing that any change in Node D's defemibility may not greatly affect the total 
defensibility in the 5 network elements, the same process was donc using Node A, which 
has almost half of the test network's assets located on it. 
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Mil itary SI,"legic 
"' "' " " " 
,. 
" " " 
,3 
0. 5 0.5 0.25 0.25 0 .25 0.25 0 0 , , 
IImphib 
, 
0.99 0,99 0.01 
Output" 0,80955 O.~5132 0.8554 0.7247 
Amphib 3 Z , , 
Outptll 0.85 241 0.7303 1 
Rank: . 3 , , 
Table 17. I!.xtreme Detection rODaoi ities lIutput 
The results from changing Node A's deteetiun probability are shown in Table 18. 
Again, altllOugh the output util ity values changed somewhat, the rankings did not change 
for either the amphibious or the airborne/air mobile missions. Node A became close to Arc 
I, find further analysis showed that had the detection probabili ty gone below 0.28736 for 
the mnphibious mission or 0.2807 18 for the airborne/air mobile mission, that the rankings 
would have switched . As shown in Table 19, when an extreme set of dl:tection 
probabilities was used where Node A's was 0.01 and the rest were 0.99, lhe values 
changed even more drnstically and Node A's ranking, as expected, changed accordingly to 
make it thl: least preferred target area. 
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Mililary Politic.l Economic Stralegic 
u, u, B' B' B; B' r' 
" 
y; y; 
C. , 0.' 0.25 0.25 0 . 2~ 0.25 C 0 , 
Amphib 
, 
0.8 0,8 0.' 
Output: 0.92092 0.7158.~ 
Amphib , , 
OutPUl 0.80647 084286 0 . 91.~31 0.71646 
; , , , 
.. Ie llS. ,A electIOn ronability Output 





r' y3 y:' 
C., 0.25 0.25 0,25 0 .25 0 0 , , 
Amphib 
, 
0.99 0 .99 0 .99 
Output· 055282 0.93199 
Amphih Rank , I 
Output 0.54699 O.853H5 0.88]34 0.93468 
R.nk , 3 , I 
Table '9. NoooA xtreme uelection Pro abilities Output 
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4. Utility Power Analysi.~ 
The finaJ modification to the input parameters measured the effects of changing the 
powers of the utility equations for value, strategic importance, and defensibility. As 
discussed in Chapter 3, it is unlikely that an operational decision maker would make 
decisions based on linear utility. It is reasonable to assume that the uti li ty equation for the 
ovt:rall value of a target area could be considered "risk adverse" because increases in the 
lower range of value parameter arc more important than (;orresponding increases at the 
higher values. This represents the operational decision maker's desire to engage target an::as 
with sufficient value to make the mission worth the effort involved. 
As mentioned previously, an added benefit of a risk adverse utility function will be 
the discrimination between rdatively low values. The percentages of value should be of the 
order of magnitude of the inverse of the total number of nodes, assuming the value is 
spread relatively uniformly across the target areas of interest. For e;'l.ampic, if there are ten 
nodes and arcs to be included in the calculations, the value percentages should be close to 
0.1. For this small scenario, the average nonnaJized value is 0.20 (for 5 areas, 115) with 
values usually ranging from ahout 0.05 up to about 0.4, so using a square root utility 
equation (utility power == 0.5) would e;'l.pand the range from about 0.2 up to about 0.65. 
The utility for the strategic importance parameter should have the opposite 
characteristics since the larger the strategic value gets, the closer the target is to the strategic 
objective. The reason for a "risk preferring" form for the utility function is driven by the 
desire to be as close as possible to the strategic objective (high values for Strategic 
importance parameter) while distances that are significantly fa r away (small valUes) may be 
regarded as roughly equally preferred. This implies the utility power for the Strategic 
Objective should be greater than 1.0 and for this trial , it is chosen to be 2.0. 
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Lastly, the defensibility of the target areas follows the same logic as the value 
parameter considering the range of the percentage values. By subtracting the percentage of 
defensibility from 1.0, however, the importance of the higher values becomes more 
significant and the utility can also be con~idered risk preferring, since incrcase~ in higher 
values are more preferred than increases in lower values. This reprcsents the desire of the 
operational decision maker to minimize the potcntial threat posed at the target area. As the 
threat levels increase substantially, the risk to his forces becomes so great that they all 
become undesirable. 
The use of a risk preferring utility curve, where the power of the utility equation is 
greater than 1.0, also expands the output values of defensibility utility in the most common 
range of values. In rhis case, however, the values are in the region of 1.0 minus the 
reciprocal of the number of potential target areas. For this example, the values should be 
close to 0.8 (I - 1/5) and in fact, the range of valnes is from 0.7062 to 0.9182 . Using a 
utility power equal to 3.0 further expands the range from 0.352210 0.7741. 
The initial run with the utility powers of 0.5, 2.0, and 3.0 produced the output 
ranking of : Node D, Node A, Node C, Node B, and then Arc I (Table 20). The 
coefficient~ used rcpresent concern for all value types with an emphasis un the unit military 
valuc, which attcmpts to ~imulate a CINC's concern with all parameters, but with a focus 
on the enemy forces. The ranking shows Node D to be the clearly preferred objective with 
Nodes A and C very close in second and third. 
The impact of changing the probability of detection of Node A to 0.5 from this 
point is seen in Table 21. The increase in variance caused Node A to drop below Node C 
in preference. The magnitudc of the change in final output utility numbers is small; 
however, Ihis ranK change will only be seen if two nodes or arcs are almost the ~ame 
initially. 
72 













Output 1. 2355 1.08951 1.2229 0.93004 
Amphib 2 4 , , 
Output 1.24029 1.09939 1.21815 
2 4 3 




" " " " " 
,2 3' 33 
0.25 0.75 0 .. 02 0 2 0.2 , , , , 
Amphib 
Utit Pwr 3 
Node C 
Output 1.0958 1.2284 
Amphih 4 2 
Output 12195 0.9378 
3 4 , , 
Table 21. -,r.;;r, A Detection Probability ana l! Ity ower Output 
An important conccrn is the impact of the utili ty power on the final rankings. By 
varying them one at a time and leaving the other lWO at their initial values, some trends or 
points of interest may be observed. If only one of thc three utility paramelers (value, 
strategic import(lnce, or de fensibility) is u!i.Cd, the rankings will nO! change because the 
utility function is increasing (as long as the power is positive); thus at least two of the three 
must be Ilscd to investigate any s ignificant results. Varying the value utility power from 
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0.05 to 1.0 in increments of 0.05 produced the rankings shown in Table 22. There wa~ a 
change in ranking for the amphibious mission between 0.35 and OAO and for the airbornd 
air mobilc mission between OAO and OA5. Although, in ncither case was the first choice 
changed, the possibility remains that it could change if the highest output utility values were 
similar. This further amplifies the need for some threshold of difference between values in 
order to properly distinguish objective priorities between two close output utility values 
The threshold could be a fu nction of the values themselves, the power used in value ut ility, 
and the number of elements considered. 
Uti lity Power AmphibRank AirbomeRank 
O_Oj D.C, A, B, 1 D, C. A, B. l 
D.C, A. B, I D,C.A, H.I 
0_15 D. C, A, E. 1 D,C,A. B, I 
0.20 D,C, A, B.I D. C, A, B, 1 
D,C, A,B, 1 D, C,A, R. I 
0.30 D, C, A, B. I Q,C,A,B, I 
D,C,A,B.l D,C, A, n , 1 
0.40 D,A, C. B, l D,C, A,B.I Change Amph.ib 
D.A,C, B, 1 D, A, C. B , 1 Change Airbome 
O,SO D,A,C, B, I D, A,C, 8.1 
0.55 D,A.C, B. 1 n. A.C. E, I 
060 D, A,C, B. I D,A, c , n, I 
0.65 D, A,C, H, I D,A. C, B. 1 
D,A, C. B, I D, A,C, n.l 
0_75 D, A,C, B, I D.A,C, B, I 
O.l!O D.A. C. R, I D. A,C, n, I 
0.85 D. A,C. B, I D,A. C,B, I 
0.90 D.A,CR, I D, A,C, R, I 
0.95 D, A. C, B. I D, A,C.B, I 
1.00 D, A,C, B, 1 D, A, C, B. l 
lable 22. Value Utlhty Sensitivity AnalYSIS 
74 
The sensitivity analysis done for the Strategic Objective parameter produced the 
resulting rankings in Table 23 by varying the utility power from 1,0 to 3.0 in increments of 
0.10. There was no rank change for the airborne/air mobile mission, but the amphibious 
mission had a change at 2.80 where Ihis time, the second most preferred node changed 
from Node A to Node C. The result shows li ttle impact in Ihe range of the initial value of 
2.0 for this scenario. 
UliJilyPowcr AmphibRank Ailoomc Rank Remarh 
1.00 O,A.C. B, I D. A.C, B, I 
1.10 D.A.C. B, I D.A. C, B. I 
1.20 D, A,C, B, I D,A, C, B, I 
1.30 D. A.C.B, I D.A. C, B. I 
\AO D, A.C,B, I D,A,C, B, I 
1.50 D, A,C, B, I D, A,C, B. I 
1.60 D, A,C,B. I D,A,C, S, 1 
1.70 D. A. C, B. I D,A, C. B.l 
1.80 D, A,C, B, I D,A,C, B, I 
D. A.C,B. I D,A,C, B, I 
2.00 D. A.C, B. I D,A.C, B. I 
D.A.C, B. I D,A.C, B, I 
2.20 D. A. C, B. I D,A,C, B, I 
2.30 D. A.C, B, I D, A,C, B. I 
2.40 D. A.C,B, I D,A,C, B, I 
2.50 D. A.C, B. I D,A .. C. B.I 
2.60 D.A, C, B. I D.A,C, B, \ 
2.70 D,A. C, B. I D, A,C, B, I 
2.80 D, C.A, B, 1 0, A.C.B, I o,angcAmphib 
2.90 D,C, A. B, I D,A,C, B. I 
300 D,C, A. B. I D. A,C,B, L 
Ta ble :.U, Strategic mportance Uti Ity SenSitivity Analysis 
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The final sensitivity analysis was done by varying the defensibility utility power 
from 1.0 to 4.0 in incremt:nts of 0.2 and the results art: presented in Table 24. There was 
no change in the rankings and only nominal changes in the output ulility valut:s. 
Ulil ity Power AmphihRank AirbomeRank Remarks 
1.00 D.A.C. B, 1 D,A.C, H,I 
1.20 D, A,C,B, 1 D,A,C, B, 1 
D.A.C, S, 1 D,A. C, H, 1 
1.60 D, A,C,R.I D.A,C,B, I 
1.80 D.A.C, S, 1 D,A. C, S, 1 
2()() I),A, C,R, I D,A,C,B,1 
D.A. C, B, 1 D.A. C, B, 1 
2.40 D,A, C, B. 1 D.A, C.R, I 
2,60 D, A.C, B. 1 D. A, C. B. 1 
2,!\O D. A, C, B, 1 D, A. C. B, I 
3,00 D, A,C, B, 1 D, A, C, B, I 
3.2() D, A,C,H, 1 D, A, C, B. 1 
3.40 D, A.c'B, I D, A, C, H, 1 
360 D,A.C. B, 1 D, A.C, B. 1 
D,A,C,B, I D, A,C, H, 1 
D,A.C, B. I D, A, C, B,I 
Table 24. Ue enst ility tility sensitivity Analysis 
D. SUMMARY OF RESULTS 
The initial results for the rankings wiUI only one parameter of interest were all 
consistent with "common-sense" analysis of each situation. The military focus of the initial 
utility outputs (Table 20) produced the output ranking of Node D. Node A, Node C. Node 
B. and Arc 1 which seems consistent with conventional military wisdom. With the 
exception of Arc 1 being kast preferred, this order of preference is what was anticipated 
when the scenario was crealed. In retrospect, however, Arc I being least preferred is 
entirely consistent with the algorithm and how it was intended . 
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Changing the probability of detection exhibited much less impacI on the outcome 
values than was expected. Tn this test scenario, the probability uf detection assumes that 
there will exist a definite de tection opportunity. Two issues arise from this situation. The 
sensor may not be capable of detecting any assets if there is bad weather or battlefield 
obscuration. In these cases, no detections would be made and no inferences could be made 
on thm pass alone. The model, however, will still have the information from previous 
passes. There will be an increase in the variation of a new estimate based on older s<::nsor 
information as it is discounted fur the time elapsed. During this time, uni ts may have 
entered or exited the target area so it is difficult to make an accurate prediction of the assets. 
It makes sense that the cxample, which had detection with a known probability, had lowcr 
than expected impact of increased variability in the perceived defenses around the objective. 
This use of prior information is not available to thl: algorithm in this test scenario. 
Instead, the approximation to the variance of the estimated number of combat assets, N, is 
computw from the hinomial approximation to the distribution of detections using Pd. This 
method docs not stem to produce the necessary increase in the upper confidence limit of the 
estimated number of a~sets on and around the objl:etivc to suhstantially changl: the output 
utility valUI:S unless the detection probability is unrealistically low 
The sensitivity analysis portion showed a potentially noticeahle impact on the output 
ranking when the value utility power was varied near the proposed value of 0.50. The two 
output utility values for Node A lind Node C arc quitl: close in the initial mility outcomes. 
For the strategic importance and defensibility, the changing of the utility powers caused 
li ttle change, and then only well beyond the proposed values of 2.0 and 3.0, respectively. 
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V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOM,\tENDATIONS 
A. CONCLUSIO:'IJS 
The challenge in modeling a decision making process in a combat model lies 
primarily in the identification of infonnation available and the appropriate use of it. In a 
theater level conflict there will be a wid!: variety of infonnation avai lable to the operational 
decision maker and his staff. The knowledge and experience that each brings wilh them 
wil! affect how they use the information and thc decisions ultimatdy made. Modeling the 
planning and execution of campaign missions should first represent as much of the 
available infurmation as possible and then make decisions using it. The impacl of the 
available infonnation is not always ea~y \0 discern or duplicate mathematically in a combat 
modeL 
The algorithm presented is the first step in incorporating some of the strategically 
significant aspects of a campaign that arc not gencrally ineluded in combat simulations. 
Computer models have traditionally omitted the other-than-combat aspects of a theater level 
conflict. The probable reasons are the initial difficulty in assigning numerical values to 
concepts sUl:h as political impact and social significance and the equally daunting task of 
then using these numbers properly. The subjectivity of both the assignmell! of the values 
and their relative importalJl:e in the del:ision making processes docs not mandate that these 
factors be overlooked, rather it should demand further investigation. It is obvious that 
there will be factors other than purely military ones that shape the decisions made at the 
theater level. 
By adding the additional value parameters, as well as elements in the network that 
possess them, JW AEP will continue to move away from traditional eumbat models. As 
discussed in Chapters 3 and 4, tlie cballenge will be the appropriate use of these proposed 
additions. 
79 
The initial results of the algorithm to evaluate tht': rdatively small nt':twork seemed 
acct':ptablc. Each different combination of wt':ights assigned to the input parameters 
produced set':mingly realistic and logical results. Varying other parameters used in the 
algorithm resulted in the appropriate changes to the output utility values and tht': objective 
rankings. Having demonstrated that the basic approach and methodology yield acceptabk 
results, the algorithm can be incorporated into JWAEP for further analysis in larger 
B. FUTURE DEVELOPMENT 
1 . Algorithm Refinements 
When the algorithm is incorporated into the JW AEP model, the larger size of the 
network may produce large sets of nodt':s and arcs to analyze. The ft':suitant pt:rcentagt': 
calculations will have a tighter grouping in the very low range. The coefficients and utility 
powers may need to be modified to overcome the clustering effect this may have. One 
possible solution may be to multiply t':ach pcrCt':ntage calculation by the number of digibJe 
nodes and arcs in order to bring the number:,; into more reasonabk rangt':s. Additionally, a 
larger numbcr of potential objectivt':s may increast': tht': chances for output values that are 
closer together and do not producc a clear preference. The examination of a threshold 
difft':rcnee between two objectives will become vt':ry important. 
As the aggregated strength variables mature, they can be included in the c.1.lculation 
of the military value of a unit. Instead of adding up only the firepower scores, future 
versions may be able to account for the unit's entire military capability. These strength 
variabks should also then be used in the calculation of defensibility. The aggregated 
~trength variahles could be expanded furtht':r to include the "intangiblt':" aspects of a unit 
such as training, experkncc, moralc, cohcsion, and lcadt':rship. These playa significant 
part in a unit's performance in battle and, like the non-military value parameters in tht': 
so 
theater model, they may be difficult to account for but should not be wholly ignured. These 
characteristics should be dynamic during the execution of the model; how the values ch:mgc 
could be relatt:d to success in battles, heavy losses, new replacements, etc. These 
proposed changes, however, depend on the n::presentation of specific individual units 
which can be identified by the opponent, not j ust unit types. 
Future refinements should include a more detailed detcnninat ion of the strategic 
importance of the objective. The method presented docs not relate the importance of a given 
target area to the course of action (COA) probahili ties, and this certainly will affect a 
potential objedive's importance. There may be synergistic effc(;ts of tactical importance 
(seen in the inherent military value of a target area) with thl: eGA prObabilities which could 
rcpresent the importance of critical tcrrain such as a chokl: point on an enemy avenue of 
advance or a c rucial supply route which supports an enemy defensive position. 
The defensibility parameter could include only those units which can actually travel 
to the objectivc in a given interval o f time rather than j ust thl: fixcd distancc that the 
algorithm uses currently. Once in J\V AEP, it should be easy to invoke the shortest path 
algurithms and use the travel rates and terrain .types to determine if a unit can, in fact, get 
there in time to assist in defending against thc assault. In general it seems more appropriate 
10 determinl: distance limits based on the tillll: I:xpccted to travel rather than just the distance 
alone. 
There is the possibility that the presence of a particular type uf unit can pose a 
hig her threat to the assault foree than its firepower score may indicate. for example, a 
medium altitude air defense missile battery may prohibit an airborne assault on a certain 
objective. The cunent process of excluding weapon systems if they do not pose a di rect 
thrl:a! to the assault force could be expanded with either specific critl:ria that prohibit 
indusion of that particular ohjective (like the objcctive with the missile battery for the 
airborne mission) or the impact of thl: unit could be magnified by lIsing a multip licative 
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factor to drive the defensibility highl;.':f, representing the greater desire to avoid that 
objective. 
In the spreadsheet model, the defensibility parameter's variances were detennined 
largely from the probahilities of dete(;tion for each target area and did not use any pan of the 
prior information that would normally be availahle in JWAEP. BeUer use of the more 
sophistieatl;.':d information available in the model could modify this initial attempt to use 
uncertainty in selecting ohjectives. Additionally, the incorporation of the uncertainty of the 
defcnsibility would bendit from the proposed modification to degrade the estimates of thc 
asset (;ounts produced by the sensors over time. During thl;.': execution of the model, the 
variance will increase if there are not timl;.':ly suhsequent sensor passes for the Bayesian 
updating process. This captures the essence of "old" intelligence versus "currcnt" 
intelligence. The exact ml;.':thod to accomplish this has not been detennined but the effect of 
aging intelligence estimates in tenns ofrdiability might be used to inercase the impact uf the 
uncertainty calculations un thc output rankings of the algorithm. 
The utility equations in the final stcps of the algorithm need more refinement, 
perhaps hy actually interviewing former operational decision makers to construct them. 
The ones used refled one group of values which seemed reasonable to the author. Much 
more work can be done to make them as reasonahle a~ possible for each parameter 
Finally, the algorithm, like all of the decision making processes in rw AEP, must 
address one of the single most important a~pects of military operations - timing. The 
importance of timing missions in order to maximize their effect on the enemy makes it 
imperative to somehow incorporate it into any mission planning logic. For small tactical 
skirmishes, a "fast as possihle" atlitude can be assumed; at the campaign level it mosl 
certainly cannot. The principles of speed and surprise must he considered, but 
coordination and timing are just as important. 
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2. Algorithm Extensions 
rhe algorithm presented could be used for other decision making processes in the 
combat model by using certain combinations of coefficients. For example, the algorithm 
could be used to choose tactical objectives for smaller engagements by considering only Ihe 
defensibility parameter. Since the defensibility p,uamcter is based solely on enemy assets 
and their effect on a particular friendly force type, the algorithm could identify perceived 
surfaces and gaps in the cnemy"s array of forces. 
A method could be developed to use the algorithm to analyze friendly forces to find 
their weaknesses and strengths. This might indicate how to better array our forces 10 
defend ourselves in a particular situation and, at the same time, attempt to predict the 
actions of the enemy by essentially putting ourselves in his shoes and seeing how we think 
we look to him. However, the mechanism for the assel counls ami expected number or 
Iypes of friendly units would have to rely on our internal command, control, and 
communications capabilities and not from sensors. An operational decision maker will not 
always know the disposition or location of his subordinate units during periods of heavy 
activity and lhis uncertainty could be incorporated in evaluating our own abilities. 
A different extension of lhe algorithm could be used 10 assign initial targeting 
priorities. The value parameter alone could provide an ordcred list of the infrastmcture and 
operating arcas in the enemy's control. Difficulties would arise in trying 10 target enemy 
units unless lhe issue of unit identification is addressed so they could be tracked and 
engaged individual ly . However, the static target list could be further refined by applying 
defensibility calculations to the perceptions of specific enemy unit types. For example, by 
comparing the value to j ust enemy air dcfcnsc onits, the algorithm can provide ini tial <lif 
targeting input for the more detailed planning and execution modules which would then 
evaluate the mi ssion feasibility, attrition estimates, and the like. Those targets heavily 
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defendcd against air strikes might then be nominatcd for cngagemcnt by long range indirect 
fire units. The perceived lype of air defense might help push the mission to the strategic 
bombing aircraft like the B-1 instead of the tactical aircraft such a~ the F/A- 18 used hy the 
aircraft caniers. 
The algorithm's use of value, importance, and defensihility to select objectives for 
forced entry missions is generalizable to many situations wherc decisions require the 
comparison betwccn value and risk as thcy arc prescnt in combat. From this initial attempt, 
future work can strive to improve the creation of the value assignments, the detcnnination 
of coefficients values and the usc of the utility cquations. 
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